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(Non)Randomization:




In centralized school admissions systems, rationing at oversubscribed schools often uses
lotteries in addition to preferences. This partly random assignment is used by empirical
researchers to identify the effect of entering a school on outcomes like test scores. This
paper formally studies if the two most popular empirical research designs successfully
extract a random assignment. For a class of data-generating mechanisms containing
those used in practice, I show: One research design extracts a random assignment un-
der a mechanism if and almost only if the mechanism is strategy-proof for schools. In
contrast, the other research design does not necessarily extract a random assignment
under any mechanism.
Keywords: Matching Market Design, Natural Experiment, Program Evaluation, Ran-
dom Assignment, Quasi-Experimental Research Design, School Effectiveness
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The spread of choice and quasi-markets in public education is giving more families the option
to attend a school other than their neighborhood default. As choice has proliferated, school
assignment has grown increasingly centralized and algorithmic in order to respect heteroge-
neous preferences and various priorities based on family background. Centralized assignment
mechanisms solve the problem of matching the limited supply of school seats to the demand
for them by using centralized algorithms. Such mechanisms are employed in Boston, Char-
lotte, Denver, New Orleans, Newark, New York City, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and
numerous Asian and European countries. Well-designed centralized assignment provides a
transparent way to achieve a fair and efficient school seat allocation, while narrowing the
scope for strategic behavior (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
Moreover, centralized assignment generates valuable data for empirical research on educa-
tion. In particular, when a school is oversubscribed, mechanisms often use random lotteries
to ration limited seats. This generates quasi-experimental variation in school assignment
that opens the door to a variety of impact evaluations. Researchers used such variation to
study schools in the Bay Area (Bergman, 2016), Boston (Angrist et al., 2016), Charlotte-
Mecklenburg (Hastings et al., 2009; Deming, 2011; Deming et al., 2014), Denver (Abdulka-
diroğlu et al., 2016), and New York (Bloom and Unterman, 2014; Abdulkadiroğlu et al.,
2014b).1
Centralized assignment mechanisms combine lotteries, preferences, and priorities into
complex stratified randomized experiments. Empirical research designs based on such mech-
anisms therefore need to condition on appropriate objects to isolate random components
of their data-generating mechanisms. Yet, the above empirical work provides only a lim-
ited foundation for how their research designs extract a conditionally random assignment.2
Although the theoretical market design literature has analyzed the welfare and strategic
properties of mechanisms, it has so far little guidance to offer empirical researchers.
1See also Hastings et al. (2012). Other studies use similar regression-discontinuity-style tie-breaking rules
to evaluate college majors in Norway (Kirkeboen et al., 2016) and in Chile (Hastings et al., 2013), daycare in
Italy (Fort et al., 2016), privately managed public schools in Trinidad and Tobago (Beuermann et al., 2016),
as well as popular selective schools in Ghana (Ajayi, 2013), Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2014), Romania (Pop-
Eleches and Urquiola, 2013), Trinidad and Tobago (Jackson, 2010, 2012), and the U.S. (Abdulkadiroğlu et
al., 2014a; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014). Narita (2015) uses lottery-based randomization to identify a structural
model of evolving demand for schools.
2An exception is Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016). See the literature review at the end of this introduction for
the relationship between my paper and theirs. The other papers simply check empirical “covariate balance.”
That is, they compare the treatment and control groups by baseline characteristics or covariates that are
fixed at the time of treatment assignment and not used for it. If the two groups’ covariates are similar
(covariates are balanced), it is interpreted as not rejecting randomization. Covariate balance is necessary
but not sufficient for randomization.
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This paper studies when widely-used empirical research designs successfully extract condi-
tionally random assignment of students to schools. I focus on the two most popular empirical
research designs that are applicable to any centralized mechanism that assigns students to
schools by combining: (1) applicants’ rank-ordered preferences over schools, (2) applicants’
priority statuses (e.g., walk zone) at schools, and (3) lottery numbers for breaking ties in
priority status. Each of the empirical examples above uses one of these research designs to
extract a random assignment.
The first research design, which I call the first-choice research design, focuses on appli-
cants who rank a given treatment school first and are in the “marginal” priority group at
the school where some students are assigned to the treatment school while others are not.
Within this first-choice subsample, some applicants are assigned to the treatment school
while others are not, though all students rank it first and share the same priority; thus it
appears that treatment assignment is determined solely by lottery numbers. Based on this
idea, the first-choice research design assumes that applicants are randomly assigned to the
treatment school conditional on being in the first-choice subsample. It then compares the
outcomes (e.g., test scores) of students in the first-choice subsample who are assigned to the
treatment school against those who are not. The outcome difference between the two groups
is interpreted as a causal effect of the treatment school.
Despite its intuitive construction, the first-choice research design extracts a random as-
signment only under a condition.3 For a class of data-generating mechanisms containing
those used in practice, I show: The first-choice research design extracts a conditionally ran-
dom assignment (i.e., applicants in the first-choice subsample share the same assignment
probability at the treatment school) for a mechanism if and almost only if the mechanism
is strategy-proof for schools.4 Here I treat strategy-proofness as an algorithmic property
that does not depend on any assumption about school behavior in reality. This result has
important implications for applied research. It justifies the first-choice research design for
mechanisms that are known to be strategy-proof for schools, such as the Boston (immediate
acceptance) mechanism (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006). It also suggests that attention should be
3How can the first-choice design fail to extract a random assignment? To gain intuition, imagine the
treatment school A has only one seat, and the first-choice subsample contains two students, 1 and 2. Student
1 ranks only A while 2 ranks other schools below A. When 2 has a better lottery number than 1, 1 is rejected
by A and does not apply for any other school. When 1 has a better lottery number, 2 is rejected by A and then
applies for other schools, potentially crowding out other students there. These crowded-out students may
apply for A, which may crowd student 1 out of A. Such chain reactions of rejections and new applications
dilute 1’s, but not 2’s, treatment assignment probability at A. As a result, 1 and 2 may have different
treatment assignment probabilities, a potential problem with the first-choice design. Section 3.1 provides a
more precise example.
4The if part is exactly true. The almost-only-if part means that the first-choice design sometimes fails to
extract a random assignment for any non-strategy-proof mechanisms used in the above empirical studies.
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paid to the research design for other widely-used mechanisms that are not strategy-proof for
schools, such as the deferred acceptance mechanism, a mechanism used in Charlotte, and
the top trading cycles mechanism.
By contrast to the above partial justification for the first-choice design, no similar suffi-
cient condition is obtainable for another popular research design, which I call the qualification
instrumental variable (IV) research design. Unlike the first-choice research design (trying to
make assignments random by focusing on a subset of students), the qualification IV research
design considers all students. It then codes a supposedly random instrumental variable for
non-random assignments. The IV is based on “qualification,” i.e., whether a student’s lottery
number is better than the worst number offered a seat at the treatment school (conditional
on priority). I find that even in the simple case with no priorities and unit school capacities,
the qualification IV research design does not necessarily extract a random assignment for
any mechanism (within my mechanism class), i.e., applicants may not share the same con-
ditional probability of qualification at the treatment school. This shows a contrast between
the qualification IV design and the first-choice design, as summarized in Table 1.5
Table 1: Summary of the main results
Do empirical research designs 1st choice Qualification IV
always extract a random assignment? research design research design
Under mechanisms
strategy-proof for schools X ×
(e.g., Boston mechanism)
Under other mechanisms
(e.g., deferred acceptance, Charlotte, × ×
and top trading cycles mechanisms)
Before I move on to the analysis, two remarks are in order about the initial result using
strategy-proofness for schools. First, I do not assume that schools have preferences or are
strategic in reality. This is because my analysis treats strategy-proofness not as a desideratum
or incentive compatibility constraint but rather as an algorithmic property, which turns out
to enable an empirical research design to extract a random assignment. Therefore, the
5This comparison is based on the set of mechanisms under which each design always extracts a random
assignment. In fact, even if I fix a particular mechanism, the same point can be made in the following
sense: The above result for the qualification IV implies that for any mechanism, the qualification IV may
not extract a random assignment even in the simple case with no priorities and unit school capacities. By
contrast, in that simple case, the first-choice design sometimes extracts a random assignment under several
mechanisms, as shown below. Therefore, even conditional on a particular mechanism, the first-choice design
is weakly more likely to extract a random assignment.
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empirical implications of my theoretical result are free from any assumption about school
behavior or preference. In addition, I need no assumption on student behavior (e.g., truthful
preference reporting) because I study how to extract a random assignment conditional on
any reported preferences in data.
Second, the initial result — strategy-proofness for schools is sufficient for the first-choice
research design to extract a random assignment — has an additional empirical implica-
tion. Particularly, it provides an asymptotic support for the first-choice research design even
for mechanisms that are not strategy-proof in general. This is because such non-strategy-
proof mechanisms like deferred acceptance are known to be approximately strategy-proof
for schools in certain large markets with many students and schools (Roth and Peranson
(1999) and subsequent studies).6 This may explain why the first-choice design appears to
extract a random assignment in empirical applications even for non-strategy-proof mech-
anisms. Viewed differently, the existing empirical justification for the first-choice research
design in the form of covariate balance regressions may suggest the empirical relevance of
theoretical results on strategy-proofness in large markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After a literature review, the next section
introduces my model. Section 3 defines the first-choice empirical research design and gives
conditions under which the research design extracts a random assignment. Section 4 ana-
lyzes the alternative qualification IV research design and compares it with the first-choice
research design. Section 5 confirms that my results are robust to a variety of modifications
to the definitions of research designs and randomization. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the
empirical implications of my theoretical results and suggests an agenda for further research.
Related Literature
This paper theoretically studies the empirical practice in the above-mentioned econometric
evaluations of school effectiveness. My analysis reveals the connection between their empir-
ical strategies and theoretical market design studies, especially those on strategy-proofness.
In addition, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016) is closely related. They develop a large-sample
framework based on an asymptotic approximation assuming a growing number of students
and school seats. They use their model to propose an improvement over the first-choice and
qualification IV research designs and apply the improved design to evaluate charter schools
in Denver. They also confirm that the first-choice and qualification IV research designs ex-
tract a random assignment for many mechanisms in the limit of their large market sequence.
In contrast, the current paper allows for general finite markets and provides conditions for
6See, among others, Immorlica and Mahdian (2005); Kojima and Pathak (2009); Azevedo and Budish
(2013); Lee (2016); Ashlagi et al. (2016).
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the first-choice or qualification IV research design to extract a random assignment in a finite
sample. These conditions allow me to compare the two research designs, as in Table 1. I
also provide additional large market justifications for the first-choice research design in large
market models different from Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016)’s.
2 Framework
I use a model of school-student assignment with coarse school priorities and lotteries. There
are a finite set I of students and a finite set S of schools. Each student i ∈ I has a strict
preference i over S ∪{∅}, where ∅ denotes the outside option of the student. This i is i’s
reported preference recorded in the data; I do not make any assumption about whether i is
truthful or not. School s is said to be acceptable for student i if s i ∅. A preference profile
for all students is denoted by I ≡ (i)i∈I . Each school s has a capacity cs. Schools also
grant students various coarse priorities. ρis ∈ {1, ..., K} denotes student i’s priority at school
s where ρis < ρjs means s prioritizes i over j. Motivated by public school applications, I
assume every student is acceptable to every school. The number of possible priority statuses
K may change as the number of students |I| changes. Priorities may be coarse in the sense
that it is possible that ρis = ρjs for some i 6= j. Let ρs ≡ (ρis)i∈I . Denote the type of student
i by θi = (i, (ρis)s∈S). I call X ≡ (I, S,I , (cs)s∈S, (ρs)s∈S) an assignment problem.
2.1 Generalized Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms
A (stochastic) mechanism maps each assignment problem into a distribution over matchings
between students and schools. Mechanisms usually use lotteries to break indifferences or
ties in priority and then use the resulting strict priorities to create a matching. A random
variable Ris denotes student i’s lottery number at school s. Assume that at each school,
Ris is iid across students according to U [0, 1]. For the correlation of lottery numbers across
different schools, I consider two focal regimes. Under a “single tie breaker” (STB), each
student has a single lottery number used by all schools, i.e., Ris = Ris′ always holds for all
i, s, and s′. Under a “multiple tie breaker” (MTB), each student has an independent lottery
number at each school, i.e., Ris and Ris′ are independent for all i and s 6= s′.7 Let ris ∈ [0, 1]
denote i’s realized lottery number at school s and let R ≡ (Ris)i∈I,s∈S, and r ≡ (ris)i∈I,s∈S.
When referring to any r, I assume ris 6= rjs for all students i, j, and school s.
7In reality, most school districts use STB, though some cities like Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and
Amsterdam use MTB. It is possible but requires messier notation to extend my analysis to any structure in
between STB and MTB where some schools use a common lottery while others use independent ones.
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To define mechanisms of interest, I first introduce the following (student-proposing) de-
ferred acceptance (DA) algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). The DA algorithm pro-
duces an assignment by using any given strict student preferences and strict school priority
orders as follows.
• Step 1: Each student i applies to her most preferred acceptable school (if any). Each
school tentatively keeps the highest-ranking students up to its capacity, and rejects
every other student.
In general, for any subsequent step t ≥ 2,
• Step t: Each student i who was not tentatively matched to any school in Step t − 1
applies to her most preferred acceptable school that has not rejected her (if any). Each
school tentatively keeps the highest-ranking students up to its capacity from the set
of students tentatively matched to this school in previous step t− 1 and the students
newly applying, and rejects every other student.
The algorithm terminates at the first step at which no student applies to any school. Each
student tentatively kept by a school at that step is allocated a seat in that school, resulting
in an assignment. I use this algorithm to define a class of mechanisms of interest as follows.8
Definition 1. A generalized deferred acceptance (gDA) mechanism ϕ is a mechanism
that can be expressed as the following procedure. Take any assignment problem as given.
(1) Draw lottery numbers r according to its lottery regime (STB or MTB).
(2) For each student i and school s, compute the modified priority
ρϕis ≡ fϕ(ρis) + gϕ(rankis),
where fϕ : N → N (N is the set of positive integers) is a strictly increasing function,
rankis is the preference rank of school s in student i’s preference i, and gϕ : N → N
is a weakly increasing function. Define school s’s ex post strict modified priority order
ϕrs over students by i 
ϕ
rs i
′ if ρϕis + ris < ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s.
(3) Given I and (ϕrs)s∈S, run the DA algorithm to produce an assignment, where each
school s’s priority order is given by ϕrs .
8Others also use similar classes of mechanisms. See, for example, Ergin and Sönmez (2006); Pathak and
Sönmez (2008); Agarwal and Somaini (2015); Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016).
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gDA mechanisms are parametrized by the lottery regime (STB or MTB) and the modified
priority function (fϕ, gϕ). This gDA class includes most of the mechanisms used in empirical
research as I now show.
Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
Given an assignment problem and realized lottery numbers, the deferred acceptance (DA)
mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) makes a matching
through the DA algorithm in which schools’ strict priorities are induced by ρis+ris. The DA
mechanism makes no modification to priorities, and it corresponds to the gDA mechanism
with (fϕ(m) = m, gϕ(n) = 0).
Boston (Immediate Acceptance) Mechanism
Given an assignment problem and realized lottery numbers, the Boston (immediate ac-
ceptance) mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003; Ergin and Sönmez, 2006) is
defined through the following immediate acceptance algorithm.
• Step 1: Each student i applies to her most preferred acceptable school (if any). Each
school accepts its highest-priority (with respect to ρis+ ris) students up to its capacity
and rejects every other student.
In general, for any step t ≥ 2,
• Step t : Each student who has not been accepted by any school applies to her most
preferred acceptable school that has not rejected her (if any). Each school accepts its
highest-priority (with respect to ρis + ris) students up to its remaining capacity and
rejects every other student.
The algorithm terminates at the first step in which no student applies to any school. Each
student accepted by a school at some step of the algorithm is allocated a seat in that school.
The immediate acceptance algorithm differs from the DA algorithm in that when a school
accepts a student at a step, in the immediate acceptance algorithm, the student is guaranteed
that school, while in the deferred acceptance algorithm, that student may be later displaced
by another student with a better priority status.
The Boston mechanism can be interpreted as modifying priorities so that each school
prioritizes students ranking it higher over students ranking it lower, and it is known that
the Boston mechanism is a gDA mechanism with (fϕ(m) = m, gϕ(n) = (K + 1)n) (Ergin
and Sönmez, 2006). Under this (fϕ(m), gϕ(n)), any school’s modified priority order is lex-
icographic in preference ranks and priority statuses. That is, i ϕrs i
′ for all i and i′ with
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rankis < ranki′s regardless of the original priorities ρis and ρi′s and lottery numbers ris and
ri′s; i ϕrs i
′ for all i and i′ with rankis = ranki′s and ρis < ρi′s regardless of lottery numbers
ris and ri′s.
Charlotte Mechanism
The mechanism used in Charlotte is the same as the Boston mechanism except that each
school respects the walk zone priority ahead of preference ranks so that every student is
guaranteed a seat at her walk zone school (Hastings et al., 2009; Deming, 2011; Deming et
al., 2014). Assume without loss of generality that ρis = 1 means i has walk zone priority at s.
The Charlotte mechanism is a gDA mechanism with (fϕ(m) = m+ 1{m > 1}[K + (K +
1)|S|], gϕ(n) = (K +1)n). Under this (fϕ(m), gϕ(n)), any school’s modified priority order is
lexicographic in the walk zone priority status, preference ranks, and other (non-walk-zone)
priority statuses. That is, i ϕrs i
′ for all i and i′ with ρis = 1 and ρi′s > 1; i ϕrs i
′ for all
i and i′ with 1{ρis = 1} = 1{ρi′s = 1} and rankis < ranki′s; i ϕrs i
′ for all i and i′ with
1{ρis = 1} = 1{ρi′s = 1}, rankis = ranki′s, and ρis < ρi′s.
3 First-Choice Empirical Research Design
As explained in the introduction, many empirical studies use data from gDA mechanisms
to identify and estimate the causal effect of assignment to a treatment school on outcomes
such as test scores, crime rates, college attendance, and earnings.9 Their empirical research
designs fall into two categories. I start with analyzing one of them and move on to the other
in Section 4.
To describe the first empirical strategy, fix any gDA mechanism ϕ and assignment prob-
lem X that generates the data at hand. Following the standard notation in econometrics, let
Dis(r) = 1 if student i is assigned the treatment school s under (realized or counterfactual)
lottery number profile r; Dis(r) = 0 otherwise. I consider the set of students who rank s
first and are in s’s “marginal priority group,” where some students are assigned s but others
are not though all of them share the same priority at s. That is, define
Firsts(r)
9Many of the studies mentioned in the introduction investigate the effect of a group of schools rather
than an individual school. My analysis extends to such group-level treatments too. Also, when the effect
of interest is that of attendance or enrollment rather than assignment, the analyst would see attendance
or enrollment as the endogenous treatment and use assignment as an instrument for the treatment. The
analyst would then use an instrumental variable method to estimate the effect of attendance or enrollment.
My analysis is applicable to such instrumental variable settings. See footnote 13.
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≡ {i ∈ I|rankis = 1 and ∃i′ such that ranki′s = 1, ρis = ρi′s, and Dis(r) 6= Di′s(r)}.10
Let r0 be the realized profile of lottery numbers in the data.
The first widely-used empirical strategy, which I call the first-choice research design,
compares the outcomes of students with Dis(r0) = 1 against those with Dis(r0) = 0 within
Firsts(r0).
11 The outcome difference between the two groups is then interpreted as the
causal effect of being assigned to school s for students in Firsts(r0). The idea is that since
all students in Firsts(r0) rank s first and share the same priority at s, whether they get an
offer from s should be determined solely by their lottery numbers and hence independent
of students’ covariates or choices correlated with outcomes. Therefore, offers from s within
Firsts(r0) are thought of as being randomly assigned in a randomized controlled trial. Albeit
intuitive, for the first-choice research design to identify a causal effect by this logic, assign-
ments to s within Firsts(r0) have to be indeed random and not confounded by non-random
preferences or priorities. This requirement is formalized as the following concept.
Definition 2. The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for a
gDA mechanism ϕ if at any assignment problem X, for any school s and all potential lottery
realizations r and all students j, k ∈ Firsts(r),
P (Djs(R) = 1) = P (Dks(R) = 1).
An equivalent requirement is
P (Dis(R) = 1|i ∈ Firsts(r), θi = θ) = P (Dis(R) = 1|i ∈ Firsts(r)),
for any student type θ for which the left-hand-side conditional probability is well-defined.
P (Dis(R) = 1|i ∈ Firsts(r), θi = θ) means the probability of assignment to s for an arbitrary
student of type θ in Firsts(r).
This property requires that conditional on being in Firsts(r0), offers from s are random and
independent of students’ preferences and priorities summarized by θi. In the econometric
10Since rankis = ranki′s = 1 holds and f
ϕ(·) is strictly increasing by definition, ρis = ρi′s is equivalent to
(fϕ(ρis) + g
ϕ(1) ≡)ρϕis = ρ
ϕ
i′s(≡ fϕ(ρi′s) + gϕ(1)).




i′s in the definition of Firsts(r) without changing anything
in the following analysis. Finally, note that it is possible Firsts(r) = ∅ for some or even all r.
11Applications of the first-choice research design include Hastings et al. (2009); Deming (2011); Abdulka-
diroğlu et al. (2014b); Bloom and Unterman (2014); Deming et al. (2014); Angrist et al. (2016).
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terminology, this requires that the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) is con-
stant across all students in Firsts(r0).
12 Only under this conditionally random assignment
are the treatment and control groups in Firsts(r0) comparable with each other. Economet-
ric program evaluation methods require this conditional independence for the first-choice
research design to identify a causal treatment effect (Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) chapters
8 and 9, Manski (2008) chapters 3 and 7, Angrist and Pischke (2009) chapter 3.2).13
3.1 Motivating Example
Despite its intuitive construction, the first-choice research design may fail to extract a random
assignment. Consider the following example.
Example 1. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, and schools A and B with the following prefer-
ences and priorities:
1 : A,B, ∅
2 : A, ∅
3 : B,A, ∅
ρA : 3, {1, 2}
ρB : 1, {2, 3},
where 1: A,B, ∅ means 1 prefers A over B and both schools are acceptable for 1; and
ρA : 3, {1, 2} means that A prioritizes 3 over 1 and 2 and is indifferent between 1 and 2. The
capacity of each school is 1. The treatment school is A.
In this example, the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment
for A for the DA mechanism (with no priority modification). Under the DA mechanism, 1
is assigned to A when 1 has a better lottery number than 2 at A. Otherwise, 3 is assigned
to A. Each of the two cases occurs with equal probability 0.5. Thus,
P (D1A(R) = 1) = 1/2 6= 0 = P (D2A(R) = 1),
12It is possible to define random assignment conditional on being in random Firsts(R), where R are
random lottery numbers and Firsts(R) is a random set. My result is robust to using such an alternative
definition; see Section 5.1.
13When assignment within Firsts(r0) is used as an instrument for an endogenous treatment such as
enrollment, Definition 2 is interpreted as a conditional independence requirement for the instrument. For
the instrument to identify a causal effect, it usually needs to additionally satisfy properties such as “exclusion”
or “monotonicity.” See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007); Manski (2008); Angrist and Pischke (2009). In this




{1, 2} if r1A < r2A∅ otherwise.
Therefore, the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment for the DA
mechanism.14
The above problem may bias treatment effect estimates. Imagine that school A has
no real treatment effect, and student 1 ranks more schools than student 2 because student
1 is more eager and higher achieving (regardless of whether she attends A). Whenever
FirstA(r) = {1, 2}, student 1 gets the seat at A and student 2 does not. Comparing 1 and
2 within FirstA(r) = {1, 2}, the researcher is likely to mistakenly conclude A has a positive
achievement effect. This raises the question: For what mechanisms does the first-choice
research design extract a random assignment as desired?
3.2 Strategy-proofness for Schools
The success or failure of the first-choice research design turns out to be linked to a seemingly
unrelated property of mechanisms. So far, I have treated priorities and lottery numbers as
public information. In this section, I depart from this assumption and imagine a hypothetical
thought experiment in which schools have priorities and lottery numbers as their private
information, and the priorities and lottery numbers represent school preferences; I come
back to the interpretation of this thought experiment at the end of this section. Suppose
a gDA mechanism asks schools to report priorities and lottery numbers. Their reports are
not necessarily truthful. The gDA mechanism then uses the reported priorities and lottery
numbers to create a matching.
Given any assignment problem (I, S,I , (cs)s∈S), let ϕ(ρ, r) ≡ (ϕs(ρ, r))s∈S be the as-
signment produced by a gDA mechanism ϕ when the reported priorities and lottery numbers
are (ρ, r). School s’s preference s, which is defined over the set of subsets of I, is said to
be responsive with respect to (cs, ρs, rs) (Roth and Sotomayor, 1992) if
(1) For any i, i′ ∈ I, if ρis+ris < ρi′s+ri′s, then for any I ′ ⊆ Ir{i, i′}, I ′∪{i} s I ′∪{i′},
(2) ∅ s I ′ for any I ′ ⊆ I with |I ′| > cs, and
14It is possible to create a similar counterexample even when there are no priorities as long as ties are
broken by MTB. Also, Section 5.2 demonstrates the first-choice research design may fail even if I modify it
to the more refined version that pools applicants who rank the treatment school first and share the same
priority at every school. Conditioning on the whole preference list is not a solution, either.
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(3) For any I ′ ⊆ I with |I ′| < cs and any i ∈ I \ I ′, it holds I ′ ∪ {i} s I ′.
I use these concepts to define the following property.
Definition 3. A gDA mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof for school s at assignment problem
X if given X, for any priority and lottery number profile (ρ∗, r∗), any preference s respon-










∗, r∗) s ϕs((ρ′s, r′s), (ρ∗−s, r∗−s)),
where s is the weak preference associated with s.15 A gDA mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof
for schools if it is strategy-proof for every school s at every X.
Though my setting is stochastic due to lotteries, this usual definition of strategy-proofness
is a non-stochastic, ex post concept. The standard behavioral interpretation of this concept
is that no school ever has a preference manipulation that is profitable with respect to its
true preference. It is crucial to note, however, that I am not concerned with this usual
interpretation. As will become clearer in the next section, in contrast to usual studies on
strategy-proofness, my analysis treats strategy-proofness not as a desideratum or an incentive
compatibility requirement. Instead I use strategy-proofness as a purely algorithmic prop-
erty and am interested not in strategy-proofness itself but in its implications for empirical
research. As a result, I do not need to assume anything about school behavior. Therefore,
the following usual questions about strategy-proofness for schools are all irrelevant for my
analysis: Do schools have preferences? Are school preferences consistent with priorities? Do
schools ever “game” the system?
3.3 Sufficiency: Strategy-proofness Generates Natural Experiments
Strategy-proofness for schools turns out to be sufficient for the first-choice research design
to extract a random assignment.
Theorem 1. The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for a gDA mech-
anism ϕ if ϕ is strategy-proof for schools.
The proof is in Appendix A.1. Combined with existing results on strategy-proofness for
schools, Theorem 1 provides positive results for the first-choice research design for some of
the gDA mechanisms. (I describe another key implication in Section 3.5.)






s) is a subset of {1, ...,K}|I| × [0, 1]|I| such that no two students share
the same value of ρis + ris at any school, where |I| is the number of students. This implies every student is







∗ may or may not be the same as ρ in X. I do not
require either r∗s or r
′
s to be consistent with ϕ’s lottery structure.
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Corollary 1. a) The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for the
Boston mechanism with any lottery regime.
b) The first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for the DA mechanism with
STB when there are no priorities (ρis = ρjs for all i, j, and s). This mechanism is often
called random serial dictatorship.
Proof. (a) follows from Theorem 1 and Ergin and Sönmez (2006)’s Theorem 2 that the
Boston mechanism is strategy-proof for schools. (b) follows from the proof of Theorem 1
and the fact that for the DA mechanism, truth-telling is optimal for any school s when all
the other schools report the same preference as s’s true preference. See Appendix A.2 for
details.
Before providing intuition, I illustrate Theorem 1 with the Boston mechanism. Consider
Example 1 in Section 3.1 and a thought experiment where schools have private preferences
and the mechanism asks schools to report their preferences. First of all, school A is never
matched with student 3 since 3 ranks A second and the seat at A is always filled by one
of the two students who rank A first. A is thus matched with either 1 or 2. When A’s
true preference is such that 1 A 2, A is matched with the more preferred student 1 by
truth-telling.16 When A’s true preference is with 2 A 1, A is matched with the more
preferred student 2 by truth-telling. Therefore, unlike with the DA mechanism discussed in
Section 3.1, there is no profitable preference manipulation for A; the Boston mechanism is
strategy-proof for A in Example 1 (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006).
As it should be by strategy-proofness and Theorem 1, the first-choice research design
extracts a random assignment for A in Example 1 for the Boston mechanism. Note that
FirstA(r) = {1, 2} for all r since only 1 and 2 rank A first with the same priority and
only one of them with a better lottery number is assigned A under any r. Enumerating all
lottery outcomes shows that 1 and 2 share the same assignment probability of 1/2 at A, i.e.,
P (D1A(R) = 1) = P (D2A(R) = 1) = 1/2. Therefore the first-choice research design extracts
a random assignment.
Intuition for the Proof
More generally, the intuition for Theorem 1 is as follows. Readers who are not interested
in the proof may skip the remainder of this section and jump to Section 3.4. A sufficient
condition for the first-choice research design to extract a random assignment for school s
is that as in randomized controlled trials, any permutation or shuffle of lottery numbers
16Since A’s capacity is 1, I do not need to distinguish its preference over sets of students and its priority
order over individual students.
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ris within Firsts(r) translates into the corresponding permutation of assignments Dis(r).
Let me name this the “Fisher property” after Ronald Fisher, the inventor of randomized
experiments. Strategy-proofness for schools turns out to guarantee this Fisher property, as
the following two-step argument illustrates. For simplicity, ignore priority and consider the
case with unit school capacities and MTB (school-specific independent lotteries).
The first step of the intuition is summarized as “a preference manipulation is a lottery
number permutation.” It is a retrospectively obvious observation that with no priority and
MTB, each school’s strict priority is pinned down solely by lottery numbers at the school.
Any preference manipulation by school s in the hypothetical thought experiment (used for
defining strategy-proofness) corresponds to a permutation of lottery numbers at s in the real
world. This step does not use strategy-proofness for schools.
The second step is summarized as “an unprofitable preference manipulation is an as-
signment permutation.” This second step is more subtle and claims that when a preference
manipulation by school s is unprofitable for s, the associated permutation of lottery num-
bers ris results in the corresponding permutation of assignments Dis(r). To get an idea of
this, consider students i0, i1 ∈ Firsts(r) such that s prefers/prioritizes i1 over i0 in the true
preference or the associated default lottery number rs. Assume that i1 is assigned to s while
i0 is not under rs. Also, suppose that there is no third student j whom s prefers over i0 but
dis-prefers over i1, i.e., ri1s < rjs < ri0s.
Now suppose that in the thought experiment, school s manipulates its preferences by









but reports all other lottery numbers honestly. What does it mean that the data-generating
gDA mechanism is strategy-proof for schools and the manipulation is unprofitable for s? It
implies under the unit-capacity assumption that following this misreport, school s’s single
seat must be assigned to student i0. To see this, consider how the DA algorithm operates
inside the gDA mechanism. In the first round, students i0 and i1 will apply to school s (as it
is their first choice by i0, i1 ∈ Firsts(r0)). School s’s single seat will be tentatively assigned
to i0, who has a better (reported) lottery number than i1 by r
′
i0s




the assumption made in the last paragraph that ri1s < ri0s, and student i1 is assigned to
school s absent school s’s manipulation.) In later rounds, school s would only reject i0 in
favor of some student j(6= i0, i1) with (true) better lottery number (rjs =)r′js < r′i0s(= ri1s).
But if school s were to get such a student j, then school s′s preference manipulation would be
profitable, contrary to strategy-proofness for schools. Therefore, student i0 will be assigned
to school s, as claimed.17
17Note that this reasoning depends on the assumption that i1 and i0 rank s first. In fact, Section 4 shows
that the intuition described here breaks down if I extend the first-choice research design to another design
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This is the desired Fisher property: School s’s preference manipulation of switching
students i0 and i1, which corresponds to permuting i0 and i1’s lottery numbers at s (ri0s
and ri1s), results in the corresponding permutation of i0 and i1’s assignments at s (Di0s(r)
and Di1s(r)). Therefore, if a gDA mechanism is strategy-proof for schools, any preference
manipulation is unprofitable and so the Fisher property holds, i.e., any lottery permutation
within Firsts(r) translates into the corresponding permutation of assignments. This enables
lottery permutations to induce a successful randomized experiment within Firsts(r), as
already explained above.
This intuition is still far from a complete proof, however. For instance, Theorem 1 allows
for additional complications like priorities, non-unit capacities, and STB, all of which the
above intuition ignores. When lotteries are correlated across schools as in STB, a lottery
permutation affects multiple schools simultaneously. This destroys the exact correspondence
between a lottery permutation in the real world and a unilateral preference manipulation by
a single school in the thought experiment, posing additional challenges. Nevertheless, the
proof in Appendix A.1 shows that the conclusion generally holds.
3.4 Almost Necessity
Theorem 1 shows that strategy-proofness for schools is sufficient for the first-choice research
design to extract a random assignment. Strategy-proofness turns out to be not only sufficient
but also nearly necessary in the following sense.
Proposition 1. Even with unit school capacities (cs = 1 for all s), the first-choice research
design does not extract a random assignment for the DA, Charlotte, and “top trading cy-
cles” mechanisms (with any lottery regime), all which are known to be not strategy-proof for
schools.
To see this, consider the DA mechanism in Example 1. Imagine A’s true preference is
3 A 1 A 2 while B’s is 1 B 2 B 3. Under these true preferences, A is matched with
1. If A misreports 3 ′A 2 ′A 1, however, A is matched with 3, the most preferred student
with respect to A. Therefore, the DA mechanism is not strategy-proof for A in Example 1.
This reconfirms the classic result that the DA mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1992).
Intuitively, school A benefits from manipulating its preference and rejecting 1 by the
following chain reaction of rejections and applications. After being rejected by A, student 1
that contains students who do not rank s first. For the extended research design, strategy-proofness for
schools is shown to be no longer sufficient for a random assignment even with no priorities and unit school
capacities.
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next applies for B, which results in B’s rejecting 3. Student 3, the most preferred student for
A, then applies for and benefits A. The same chain reaction causes the first-choice research
design to fail. Depending on schools ranked below A, different applicants cause different
chain reactions that have different effects on assignment probabilities at A. As I showed in
Section 3.1, this can cause applicants in FirstA(r0) to have different assignment probabilities
at A.18
Similarly, the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment for the
Charlotte mechanism, another mechanism that is not strategy-proof for schools. Suppose
that 3’s priority at A and 1’s priority at B in Example 1 are walk zone priorities. In this case,
the Charlotte mechanism coincides with the DA mechanism in Example 1. The Charlotte
mechanism is therefore manipulable by schools and the first-choice research design fails in
the same way as for the DA mechanism. Section 5.3 also shows the same failure of the
first-choice design for yet another mechanism (the top trading cycles mechanism) that is not
strategy-proof for schools. In these senses, strategy-proofness for schools is almost necessary
for the first-choice research design to extract a random assignment.19
Empirical Illustration
Denver Public Schools use the usual DA mechanism for unified public and charter school
admissions. As shown above, the DA mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools and may
not extract a random assignment via the first-choice research design. To see whether the
first-choice research design extracts a random assignment in Denver, I use the data from its
DA mechanism in school year 2011-2012 as follows.
(1) Taking student preferences, school priorities, and capacities as fixed, I simulate the
DA mechanism by drawing counterfactual lottery numbers one million times. This
gives me an approximate assignment probability P̂ (Dis(R) = 1) for each student i and
school s, i.e., the empirical frequency of student i’s being assigned to s over the one
million simulations.20
18In contrast, for the Boston mechanism analyzed in the last section, such chain reactions do not affect
assignments to A. By its construction, for the Boston mechanism, each school is forced to prioritize students
ranking it higher over students ranking it lower. As a result, chain reactions caused by student i at schools
ranked below A involve only students who rank A lower than student i does. Since A rejects i, A also rejects
any students ranking A lower than i and thus A never accepts any student involved in chain reactions i
causes. Thus, different chain reactions caused by different students have the same effect on assignments at
A, that is, no effect at all. This is the reason why the Boston mechanism is strategy-proof for schools and
the first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for it.
19On the other hand, strategy-proofness for schools turns out to be not exactly necessary. See Appendix
B.2 for details.
20In Denver, each school is divided into multiple sub-schools (called “buckets”) with their own priorities
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(2) For each school s and each student i in the realized first-choice subsample Firsts(r0)
(if any), I demean i’s assignment probability by subtracting the mean of assignment
probabilities at s across all students in Firsts(r0). That is, I compute
P̂ demean(Dis(R) = 1) = P̂ (Dis(R) = 1)−
Σj∈Firsts(r0)P̂ (Djs(R) = 1)
|Firsts(r0)|
.
(3) I plot this assignment probability deviation P̂ demean(Dis(R) = 1) across all schools s
and all students in Firsts(r0).

















-1 -.5 0 .5 1
(Propensity Score at 1st Choice School)-(Mean at Each School)
Notes: I simulate the DA mechanism with STB by drawing counterfactual lottery numbers one million times.
This gives us an approximate assignment probability. For each school s and each student i in Firsts(r0),
I demean i’s assignment probability by subtracting the mean of assignment probabilities at s across all
students in Firsts(r0). I plot the demeaned assignment probability across all students in ∪s∈SFirsts(r0).
The resulting histogram is in Figure 1. If the 1st choice strategy extracts a random
assignment, P̂ (Dis(R) = 1) ≈ P̂ (Djs(R) = 1) for all s and all i, j ∈ Firsts(r0) and so the
assignment probability deviation P̂ demean(Dis(R) = 1) would be almost 0 (up to simulation
errors) for all s and all i in Firsts(r0). As the figure shows, however, there are many values
of P̂ demean(Dis(R) = 1) that are far from 0. The mean is almost 0 (by construction) but
and capacities. Buckets correspond to schools in my theoretical model. Below I use “schools” to mean
buckets. See Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016) for more details of the Denver school admissions system.
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the standard deviation is around 0.19. This provides an empirical illustration of the theo-
retical necessity of strategy-proofness for schools. I leave for future research whether these
assignment probability deviations result in any serious bias in treatment effect estimates.
3.5 Explaining Empirical Regularities
My analysis shows that the first-choice research design extracts a random assignment for
a gDA mechanism if and almost only if the mechanism is strategy-proof for schools. This
justifies its use for strategy-proof mechanisms such as the Boston mechanism. However, care
should be taken when using it for non-strategy-proof mechanisms such as the DA, Charlotte,
and top trading cycles mechanisms.
There remains the puzzle, however, that even under the DA and Charlotte mechanisms,
the first-choice research design often receives empirical support for randomization. In partic-
ular, such applications usually find that in the first-choice subsample Firsts(r0), observable
covariates of students with Dis(r0) = 1 and Dis(r0) = 0 are similar, a standard check of
a necessary condition for randomization.21 How can I resolve the tension between their
empirical validity findings and my theoretical result?
A potential resolution is hinted by Theorem 1, the sufficiency of strategy-proofness for
schools. Unlike small counterexamples like Example 1, empirical work is only done with
data with at least hundreds of students. Though the DA and Charlotte mechanisms are not
strategy-proof for schools in general, they are often approximately so in certain large markets
with many students and schools, as has been shown empirically and theoretically (Roth and
Peranson, 1999; Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Azevedo and
Budish, 2013; Lee, 2016; Ashlagi et al., 2016). The reason is that as the number of students
and schools grows, chain reactions of rejections and applications at schools ranked below
a manipulating school — which make the DA and Charlotte mechanisms manipulable in
Example 1 — become less likely to come back to the manipulating school and benefit it.
Existing empirical settings with hundred or thousands of students may therefore be subject
to large market forces that make the DA and Charlotte mechanisms almost non-manipulable
by schools. If so, Theorem 1 suggests the first-choice research design approximately extracts
a random assignment even for the DA and Charlotte mechanisms.
To see the effect of such large market forces, Figure 2 plots assignment probabilities at A
for two types of expansions of Example 1 and the DA mechanism (equivalent to the Charlotte
mechanism in this example).22 A computer program to implement this simulation is available
21See, for example, Hastings et al. (2009)’s Table VI, Deming (2011)’s Table I, Abdulkadiroğlu et al.
(2014b)’s Table 2, Deming et al. (2014)’s Table A2.
22Figure 2b is of more interest in that it is closer to the models of the above papers on strategy-proofness
19
Figure 2: The Counterexample Evaporates in Large Markets
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Number of Students of Each Type and Seats at Each School
Probability of Assignment to School A
Notes: In Panel 2a, for each value of the x axis, I create an expansion of Example 1 with 2x schools
A1, ..., Ax, B1, ..., Bx with one seat each, and 3x students such that there are x students with each of the
following three preferences:
1 : A1, B1, A2, B2, ..., Ax, Bx, ∅
2 : A1, ..., Ax, ∅
3 : B1, A1, B2, A2, ..., Bx, Ax, ∅
ρA1 , ..., ρAx : {students with 3}, {students with 1 or 2}
ρB1 , ..., ρBx : {students with 1}, {students with 2 or 3}.
In Panel 2b, for each value of the x axis, I create another expansion of Example 1 with x seats at each
of schools A and B, and 3x students such that there are x students of each of the three types. For each
scenario, I approximate the assignment probabilities by simulating the DA mechanism (equivalent to the
Charlotte mechanism in this example) with STB 100000 times.
upon request. This figure reveals that as the market size grows, the discrepancy between
student types 1 and 2’s assignment probabilities at A disappears, implying that breaks in
randomization under the first-choice research design become smaller and smaller. This may
explain why the first-choice research design often appears to extract a random assignment
in empirical applications even for mechanisms that are not strategy-proof for schools. At
the same time, the existing empirical support for the first-choice research design for the DA
and Charlotte mechanisms (recall footnote 21) can be re-interpreted as suggesting that large
market forces emphasized by the above theoretical market design papers are empirically
relevant. Theorem 1 thus provides a delicate asymptotic justification for the research design
even for some mechanisms that are not strategy-proof for schools in general.23
in large markets. For Figure 2a, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2016) complementarily show that in its limit, the
first-choice design extracts a random assignment under the DA mechanism.
23This suggests that many empirical studies using the first-choice design for non-strategy-proof mechanisms
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4 Qualification Instrumental Variable Research Design
While the previous sections focus on the first-choice research design, several empirical studies
use an alternative research design, which I call the qualification instrumental variable (IV)
research design.24 Unlike the first-choice research design (which tries to make assignments
random by focusing on a subset of students), the qualification IV research design considers
all students and tries to code a random instrumental variable for non-random assignments.
Define the qualification IV by
Zis(r) ≡ 1{ρϕis + ris ≤ max{ρ
ϕ
js + rjs|Djs(r) = 1}}.
If there is no j with Djs(r) = 1, then define Zis(r) = 1 for all i. The qualification IV for a
student at a school is turned on if her realized priority rank at the school is better than that
of some student assigned to the school. Note that Zis(r) = 1 is possible even for students
who do not apply to school s.
The qualification IV looks random conditional on ρϕis and is likely to be correlated with
assignment Dis(r) since i never gets assigned when she is not qualified (Zis(r) = 0) but she
can get assigned when she is qualified (Zis(r) = 1). Based on this idea, the qualification IV
research design instruments for assignment Dis(r) by qualification Zis(r) conditional on ρ
ϕ
is
and estimates treatment effects by Two Stage Least Square or other instrumental variable
models (Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) chapter 4, Manski (2008) chapter 3, Angrist and Pis-
chke (2009) chapter 4).25 For this research design to identify a causal effect, the qualification
IV needs to be random conditional on ρϕis, as formalized in the following definition.
Definition 4. The qualification IV research design extracts a random assignment
for a gDA mechanism ϕ for school s at assignment problem X if given ϕ and X, for all
modified priority ρ and student type θ,
provide an unexpected set of empirical settings where treatment assignment is asymptotically random (but
not exactly random in a finite sample). For inference, therefore, it is appropriate to use recent econometric
program evaluation methods based on asymptotically random treatment assignment, such as Canay et al.
(2014) and Belloni et al. (2014).
24For empirical examples of the qualification IV design, see Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013); Dobbie and
Fryer (2014); Lucas and Mbiti (2014).
25That is, for outcome Yi of interest and the realized lottery outcome r0 in the data, the qualification IV
research design uses the following Two Stage Least Square regression or a similar IV model:






is = k}+ ε2i (second stage regression)






is = k}+ ε1i (first stage regression)
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P (Zis(R) = 1|ρϕis = ρ, θi = θ) = P (Zis(R) = 1|ρ
ϕ
is = ρ).
An equivalent requirement is
P (Zjs(R) = 1) = P (Zks(R) = 1)
for all students j, k ∈ I with ρϕjs = ρ
ϕ
ks. The qualification IV research design extracts a
random assignment for a gDA mechanism ϕ if it does so for every school s at every problem
X.
This property requires that conditional on modified priority status ρϕis, being qualified for
s is random and independent of students’ preferences and priorities summarized by θi. Only
under this conditionally random assignment does the qualification IV Zis generate exogenous
or random variation in assignment Dis.
26 It turns out that no gDA mechanism satisfies the
above property even in the simple case with no priorities and unit capacities.
Proposition 2. Consider any sets of at least three students and at least three schools. Even
with no priorities (ρis = ρjs for all students i, j, and school s) and unit school capacities
(cs = 1 for all s), there exist student preference profiles at which every student ranks some
schools and the following holds: There is no gDA mechanism with any lottery regime for
which the qualification IV research design extracts a random assignment.
The proof is in Appendix A.3. I illustrate this result by an example.
Example 2. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and schools A, B, C with the following
preferences and priorities:
1 : B,A, ∅
2 : B, ∅
3 : C,A, ∅
4,5 : C, ∅
ρA, ρB, ρC : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The capacity of each school is 1. The treatment school is A.
26Definition 4 for the qualification IV design may appear to be incomparable with Definition 2 for the
first-choice design. However, Appendix B.1 shows that these two definitions are special cases of a unified
definition of a random assignment under general empirical research designs, including the first-choice and
qualification IV designs. Hence, it is legitimate to use Definitions 2 and 4 to compare the two research
designs.
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Students 1 and 3 share the same modified priority ρϕiA for any gDA mechanism ϕ:




ϕ(rank3A) ≡ ρϕ3A, which I denote by ρ. Nevertheless,
enumerating all possible lottery orders shows that for any gDA mechanism, we have
P (ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1) = 2/3 6= 5/6 = P (ZiA(R) = 1|ρ
ϕ
iA = ρ, θi = θ3) for STB
P (ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1) = 2/3 6= 3/4 = P (ZiA(R) = 1|ρ
ϕ
iA = ρ, θi = θ3) for MTB.
A computer program to implement this computation is available upon request. Therefore,
even with no priorities and unit capacities, the qualification IV research design does not
extract a random assignment for any gDA mechanism.27
Intuitively, the qualification IV research design fails in this example because students 1
and 3 experience different levels of competition at their first-choice schools B and C, respec-
tively, before applying for A. Let me consider the following cases.
Case i : Neither student 1 nor 3 applies for A, i.e., 1 and 3 are assigned B and C, respectively.
In this case, no student applies for A, and A is undersubscribed. Both 1 and 3 are therefore
qualified for A.
Case ii : Only student 1 applies for A. In this case, 1 is always assigned A and qualified
for A. By ρϕ1A = ρ
ϕ
3A shown above, student 3 is qualified for A if and only if 3 has a better
lottery number than 1 at A.
Case iii : Only student 3 applies for A. In this case, 3 is always assigned A and qualified for
A. Student 1 is qualified for A if and only if 1 has a better lottery number than 3 at A.
Case iv : Both students 1 and 3 apply for A. In this case, only one of 1 and 3 with a better
lottery number is assigned A and qualified for A.
For simplicity, consider the MTB lottery regime. Cases i and iv are ignorable since they
do not cause any difference between 1’s and 3’s qualification probabilities at A. Conditional
27Since both ρϕ1A = ρ
ϕ
3A and ρ1A = ρ3A, the counterexample works even if I use original priorities to
define an alternative qualification IV as Z ′is(r) ≡ 1{ρis + ris ≤ max{ρjs + rjs|Djs(r) = 1}}. Also, note that
students 1 and 3 share the same priority at all schools in the above example. Thus, the qualification IV
research design may fail even if I modify it to the more refined version that conditions on having the same
priority at all schools. Finally, the qualification IV research design does not extract a random assignment
even for the top trading cycles mechanism, as shown in Section 5.3.
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on Case ii, student 1 is qualified for sure while 3 is qualified with probability 0.5, the
probability that 3 has a better lottery number than 1 for A. Likewise, conditional on Case
iii, student 3 is qualified for sure, but 1 is qualified only with probability 0.5. Crucially,
Case iii is more likely to happen than Case ii since 3’s first choice (C) is more competitive
than 1’s (B) and so 3 is more easily rejected by the first choice and more likely to apply for
A. As a result, 3 is more likely to be qualified for A than 1 due to differential competition
at their first-choice schools, as the proof in Appendix A.3 makes it precise. The proof also
generalizes this observation to any lottery regime and any market size. Section 5.2 shows
that the problem with the qualification IV persists even if I modify its definition, e.g., by
changing the priority cutoff max{ρϕjs + rjs|Djs(r) = 1} to a constant number.
The above discussion illustrates a general point that students may have different qualifi-
cation probabilities depending on which schools they rank higher than the treatment school.
This does not matter for students in the first-choice subsample Firsts(r0) since everybody
in Firsts(r0) ranks the same schools above the treatment school, that is, no school at all.
Therefore, the above trouble does not happen to the first-choice research design focusing on
the first-choice subsample Firsts(r0). In this sense, there are more threats to the qualifica-
tion IV design than to the first-choice design.
Proposition 2 therefore sheds light on a contrast between the qualification IV and the
first-choice research designs. Unlike the first-choice research design, strategy-proofness for
schools is no longer sufficient for the qualification IV research design to extract a random
assignment, and it may extract an unintended broken random assignment not only for the
DA or top trading cycles mechanism but also for the Boston mechanism and random serial
dictatorship discussed in Corollary 1.
5 Discussion
5.1 Alternative Definition of a Random Assignment
Definition 2 of a “random assignment” requires that all students in realized fixed set Firsts(r0)
share the same assignment probability (propensity score). A possible alternative definition
treats Firsts(R) as random and requires that
P (Dis(R) = 1|i ∈ Firsts(R), θi = θ) = P (Dis(R) = 1|i ∈ Firsts(R))
for all i for whom these probabilities are defined. Recall that R denotes the random (not real-
ized) lottery number profile. This alternative definition requires that Dis(R) is independent
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of type θi or the propensity score as a confounder conditional on random event i ∈ Firsts(R).
This independence conditional on a random event or statistic is reminiscent of Chamberlain
(1980) and Rosenbaum (1984)’s conditional logit panel frameworks, where the treatment
distribution is independent of individual heterogeneity conditional on the random empirical
frequency of being treated in the past.
All of my arguments extend to this alternative definition. See Appendix A.1 (especially
Remark 1) for why Theorem 1 is correct even under the alternative definition. The discus-
sion about the Boston mechanism under Example 1 in Section 3.3 goes through even under
the alternative definition since P (DiA(R) = 1|i ∈ FirstA(R), θi = θ) = 1/2 for i = 1, 2 and
is independent of θ. The analysis of the DA and Charlotte mechanisms in Example 1 in
Sections 3.1 and 3.4 also remains essentially the same since
P (DiA(R) = 1|i ∈ FirstA(R), θi = θ1) = 1 6= 0 = P (DiA(R) = 1|i ∈ FirstA(R), θi = θ2),
where θ1 and θ2 denote student types having 1 and 2, respectively. This shows that the
first-choice design does not extract a random assignment.
5.2 Alternative Definitions of Research Designs
Section 4 shows a potential problem with the qualification IV Zis(r) ≡ 1{ρϕis + ris ≤
max{ρϕjs + rjs|Djs(r) = 1}}, where max{ρ
ϕ
js + rjs|Djs(r) = 1} is a random priority cutoff
that varies as the lottery outcome changes. One may expect a modification of the qualifica-




is + ris ≤ π}.
In practice, the econometrician would define π ≡ max{ρϕjs+r0js|Djs(r0) = 1} where r0 is the
realized lottery numbers in the data. The constant cutoff qualification IV trivially extracts
a random assignment since P (Zπis(R) = 1|ρ
ϕ




is = ρ, θi =
θ) = π − ρ, which is constant and independent of θ conditional on ρϕis = ρ.
However, the constant cutoff qualification IV entails new problems other than random-
ness. First, when using π ≡ max{ρϕjs + r0js|Djs(r0) = 1}, I define or select an instrument
depending on the realized data. Such data-dependent model selection often makes standard
inference invalid (Leamer, 1978). In addition, perhaps more importantly, the constant cutoff
qualification IV may violate other requirements for a valid IV than random assignment or
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independence even with no priority. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 3. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, 4 and schools A and B with the following prefer-
ences and priorities:
1,2 : A,B, ∅
3,4 : B, ∅
ρA, ρB : {1, 2, 3, 4}.




Consider two lottery outcomes at school A:
• rA ≡ (r1A, r2A, r3A, r4A) with r1A < r2A < r3A, r4A and r2A ≤ 0.5
• r′A ≡ (r′1A, r′2A, r′3A, r′4A) with r′3A, r′4A < r′2A < r′1A and r′2A > 0.5.
Fix any lottery numbers rB at school B. Clearly, Z
0.5
1A (rA, rB) = Z
0.5
2A (rA, rB) = 1 and
Z0.51A (r
′




A, rB) = 0. On the other hand, for any gDA mechanism, D1A(rA, rB) =
1, D1A(r
′
A, rB) = 0, D2A(rA, rB) = 0, and D2A(r
′
A, rB) = 1. This violates the “monotonic-
ity” requirement for Z0.5iA as an instrument for DiA: Endogenous variables D1A and D2A
move in the opposite directions in response to the same change in the IV from Z0.5iA = 1 to
Z0.5iA = 0. Monotonicity is required by many modern IV models with heterogeneous behavior
and treatment effects (Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) chapter 4, Manski (2008) chapter 3,
Angrist and Pischke (2009) section 4.4). Therefore, while the constant cutoff qualification
IV always extracts a random assignment, it may not be able to identify a causal effect due
to monotonicity violations.
Furthermore, since FirstA(r) = {1, 2} for all r, this monotonicity violation persists even




2A and ρ1A = ρ2A, the
counterexample works even if I use original priorities to define an alternative constant cutoff
qualification IV as Z0.5is (r) ≡ 1{ρiA + ris ≤ 0.5}. Finally, note that 1 and 2 share the same
priority at all schools. Thus the constant cutoff qualification IV research design may fail to
satisfy monotonicity even if I modify it to the more refined version that conditions on having
the same priority at all schools.
Example 3 also shows that yet another potential modification of the qualification IV does
not extract a random assignment either. For any positive integer m, define the constant
rank qualification IV by
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Zm-this (r) ≡ 1{ris ≤ m-th({rjs|j ∈ I})},
where m-th(·) is the m-th order statistic.28 The constant rank qualification IV extracts a
random assignment since P (Zm-this (R) = 1|ρ
ϕ
is = ρ, θi = θ) = m/|I| is independent of θ.
However,
• Z2nd1A (rA, rB) = Z2nd2A (rA, rB) = 1(= Z0.51A (rA, rB) = Z0.52A (rA, rB)) and
• Z2nd1A (r′A, rB) = Z2nd2A (r′A, rB) = 0(= Z0.51A (r′A, rB) = Z0.52A (r′A, rB)).
Therefore, by the same reason for Z0.5iA , potential IV Z
2nd
iA violates monotonicity regardless
of whether I restrict the sample to FirstA(r0).
29 The above discussion also shows that
the simplest possible IV, the random number ri itself, suffers from the same monotonicity
violation.
Finally, going back to the original first-choice and qualification IV research designs, they
might fail to extract a random assignment even if I modify them to the more refined ver-
sion that conditions on sharing the same priority at every school. Consider the following
modification of Example 1.
Example 4. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, and schools A and B with the following prefer-
ences and priorities:
1 : A,B, ∅
2 : A, ∅
3 : B,A, ∅
ρA : 3, {1, 2}
ρB : {1, 2, 3},
where ρ3A is walk zone priority. The indifferences in the school priorities are broken by STB.
The capacity of each school is 1. The treatment school is A.
The only difference from Example 1 is ρB: School B is now indifferent among all students.
In Example 4, students 1 and 2 rank A first and share the same priority at both A and B.
However, students 1 and 2 do not share the same assignment probability at A for the DA or








is})} or 1{ρis+ris ≤
m-th({ρjs + rjs|j ∈ I, ρjs = ρis})}. The discussion below applies to these alternative definitions too.
29All of the above points in this Section 5.2 apply to the top trading cycles mechanism, as shown in the
next Section 5.3.
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Charlotte mechanism: Under the DA mechanism,
FirstA(r) =
∅ if r2 < r1 < r3{1, 2} otherwise,
where ri is student i’s lottery number used by both schools. Nevertheless, enumerating all
lottery outcomes shows that
P (DiA(R) = 1|θi = θ1) = P (ZiA(R) = 1|θi = θ1) = 1/2
6= 1/3 = P (DiA(R) = 1|θi = θ2) = P (ZiA(R) = 1|θi = θ2).
Thus neither the first-choice or qualification IV research design extracts a random assignment
for the DA mechanism even if they condition on sharing the same priority at every school.
For the first-choice research design, this point remains true even if using the alternative
random assignment criterion in Section 5.1 since P (DiA(R) = 1|i ∈ FirstA(R), θi = θ1) =
3/5 6= 2/5 = P (DiA(R) = 1|i ∈ FirstA(R), θi = θ2).
Likewise, conditioning on the whole preference list is not a solution. Consider yet another
modification of Example 1.
Example 5. There are applicants 1, 2, 3, and schools A and B with the following prefer-
ences and priorities:
1 : A,B, ∅
2 : A,B, ∅
3 : B,A, ∅
ρA : 3, {1, 2}
ρB : 1, 3, 2,
where ρ3A and ρ1B are walk zone priority. The capacity of each school is 1. The treatment
school is A.
The key difference from Example 1 is 2: Students 1 and 2 share the same preference
list, i.e., 1=2. Nevertheless, the first-choice or qualification IV research design does not
extract a random assignment for the DA or Charlotte mechanism: 1 is assigned to A when
1 has a better lottery number than 2 at A. Otherwise, 3 is assigned to A. Each of the two
cases occurs with equal probability 1/2. Thus,
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P (D1A(R) = 1) = P (Z1A(R) = 1) = 1/2 6= 0 = P (Z2A(R) = 1) = P (D2A(R) = 1),
despite having
FirstA(r) =
{1, 2} if r1A < r2A∅ otherwise.
Therefore, the first-choice or qualification IV research design does not necessarily extract a
random assignment for the DA or Charlotte mechanism even if one additionally conditions
on the entire preference list.
5.3 Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
Some cities such as New Orleans and San Francisco have used a mechanism outside the gen-
eralized DA class studied in this paper. This mechanism, the top trading cycles mechanism,
is also advocated by matching market design researchers as a Pareto efficient mechanism
that is strategy-proof for students (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).
Definition 5. The top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism creates a matching through
the following procedure. Take any assignment problem as given.
(1) Draw r according to its lottery regime (STB or MTB).
(2) Define s’s ex post strict priority order rs over students by i rs i′ if ρis+ris < ρi′s+ri′s.
(3) Given I and (rs)s∈S, run the following top trading cycles algorithm (Shapley
and Scarf, 1974).
• Step t ≥ 1: Each student i points to her most preferred acceptable remaining
school (if any). Students who do not point to any school are assigned to ∅. Each
school s points to its most preferred student. As there are a finite number of
schools and students, there exists at least one cycle, i.e., a sequence of distinct
schools and students (i1, s1, i2, s2, . . . , iL, sL) such that student i1 points to school
s1, school s1 points to student i2, student i2 points to school s2, . . . , student iL
points to school sL, and, finally, school sL points to student i1. Every student
il (l = 1, . . . , L) in any cycle is assigned to the school she is pointing to. Any
student who has been assigned a school seat or the outside option as well as any
school s which has been assigned students such that the number of them is equal
to its capacity cs is removed. If no student remains, the algorithm terminates.
Otherwise, it proceeds to the next step.
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This algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps because at least one student
is matched with a school (or ∅) at each step and there are only a finite number of
students.
It is possible to apply the first-choice research design to data from the TTC mechanism.
However, the TTC implementation of the first-choice research design turns out not to extract
a random assignment, as stated in Proposition 1.30 In Example 1, the TTC mechanism
always assigns 1 to A under all lottery realizations r (regardless of whether the lottery
structure is STB or MTB); no randomization occurs. Therefore, FirstA(r) = {1, 2} for all
r, but P (Dis(R) = 1|θi = θ1) = 1 6= 0 = P (Dis(R) = 1|θi = θ2). Thus the first-choice
research design does not extract a random assignment for the TTC mechanism.31 The same
logic also implies that the qualification IV research design fails in this example. In fact,
the qualification IV research design for the TTC mechanism does not extract a random
assignment even without priorities. It can be seen from Example 2, since there are no
priorities and the top trading cycles mechanism is equivalent to the DA mechanism.
This failure of the first-choice research design is related to the fact that the TTC mech-
anism is not strategy-proof for schools. In Example 1, imagine A’s true preference is
3 A 2 A 1 while B’s is 1 B 2 B 3. Under these true preferences, A is matched
with 1. If A misreports 2 ′A 1, 3, however, A is matched with 2, who is preferred to 1
under A. Therefore, the TTC mechanism is not strategy-proof for A in Example 1. This
is a reconfirmation of the well-known fact that the TTC mechanism is not strategy-proof for
schools, and provides further support for the necessity of strategy-proofness for schools for
successful randomization under the first-choice research design.
6 Conclusion
The above analysis provides a formal basis for understanding when and why the two popular
empirical research designs do or do not extract a random assignment. The first-choice design
does so for mechanisms that are strategy-proof for schools; the design may break down
for other mechanisms, but the problem approximately goes away in certain large markets
where these mechanisms become approximately strategy-proof. On the other hand, the
qualification IV design does not necessarily extract a random assignment for any mechanism,
30It is possible to show that the more refined version of the first-choice design which conditions on having
the same priority at every school extracts a random assignment for the TTC mechanism. This makes a
contrast with the DA and Charlotte mechanisms, for which even the more refined first-choice design does
not extract a random assignment (recall Section 5.2).
31This point remains the same under the alternative definition of extracting a random assignment in
Section 5.1: P (DiA(R) = 1|i ∈ FirstA(R), θi = θ1) = 1 6= 0 = P (DiA(R) = 1|i ∈ FirstA(R), θi = θ2).
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thus suggesting a difference between the two research designs. Table 1 in the introduction
provides a summary of the main results.
This paper takes a step toward deciphering theoretical structures hidden in empirical
research designs exploiting market design with lotteries. This opens the door to several open
questions. For example, while my framework assumes the use of random lottery numbers
for tie-breaking, some existing empirical studies use data with regression-discontinuity-style
tie-breaking by admissions test scores. I would expect the point of the current paper to be
valid even in regression discontinuity situations, but it is open how to extend this paper’s
results to a regression discontinuity setting. Also, my results point to the importance of
strategy-proofness for schools within the mechanism class I focus on. It is thus important to
characterize or axiomatize mechanisms that are strategy-proof for schools in the class. It is
also a technical open question to use Theorem 1 and existing results on strategy-proofness
in the large to formally justify the first-choice research design in large markets.
An even more ambitious agenda is to design assignment mechanisms that enable as
informative causal inference as possible (subject to welfare and strategic considerations). For
example, it is intriguing to compare the Boston, DA, and top trading cycles mechanisms with
different lottery regimes by their capabilities for quasi-experimental information production.
The contrast between Corollary 1 and Proposition 1 is a step toward such a comparison.
Finally, the empirically most important direction is to see if possible randomization failures
(recall Propositions 1 and 2) cause significant biases in treatment effect estimates in real
data. I leave these challenging directions for future research.
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Preliminaries
I use the following lemma to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. a) The following holds for any assignment problem and any gDA mechanism ϕ
that is strategy-proof for schools. For each lottery number profile r, let δs(r) be any permu-
tation of rs that switches only i







ρϕis + ris for all i with Dis(r) = 1. If there are no such i
′ and i′′, let δs(r) = rs. Then
ϕ(r) = ϕ(δs(r), r−s), where ϕ(r) is a shorthand for ϕ(ρ, r), the assignment produced by a
gDA mechanism ϕ when the reported priorities and lottery numbers are (ρ, r).
b) The following holds for any assignment problem and any gDA mechanism ϕ. For each
lottery number profile r, let δs(r) be any permutation of rs that switches only two students i
′
and i′′ such that ρϕi′s = ρ
ϕ





ri′′s} ≤ ρϕis + ris. If there are no such i′ and i′′, let δs(r) = rs. Then ϕ(r) = ϕ(δs(r), r−s).
Proof of Lemma 1. a) For any assignment problem, a deterministic assignment (or a
matching) is a vector µ that assigns each school s a set of at most cs students µs ⊂ I, and
assigns each student i a seat at a school or the outside option µi ∈ S ∪ {∅}. A matching µ
is individually rational if µi i ∅ for every i ∈ I. With the notation ρϕ ≡ (ρϕis)i∈I,s∈S, µ
is (ρϕ, r)-blocked by (s, i) ∈ S × I if s i µi and either |µs| < cs or there exists ī ∈ I such
that i ϕrs ī, i.e., ρ
ϕ
is + ris < ρ
ϕ
īs
+ rīs. A matching µ is (ρ
ϕ, r)-stable if it is individually
rational and not (ρϕ, r)-blocked by (s, i).
Fact 1. (Roth and Sotomayor (1992)’s Theorem 5.8) For any assignment problem X, any
lottery number profile r, any gDA mechanism ϕ, any (ρϕ, r)-stable matching µ, any school s,
any preference ϕs responsive with respect to (cs, ρϕ, r), it holds µs ϕs ϕs(ρ, r), where ϕs(ρ, r)
is the set of students assigned to s in the outcome of ϕ under X and r.
Fact 2. (Roth and Sotomayor (1989)’s Theorem 4) For any assignment problem X, any
lottery number profile r, and any gDA mechanism ϕ, let µ and µ′ be (ρϕ, r)-stable matchings
with µs ϕs µ′s for some preference ϕs responsive with respect to (cs, ρϕs , rs). Then, for any
i ∈ µs and i′ ∈ µ′s \ µs, it holds i ϕrs i




Fact 3. Under any assignment problem, any lottery number profile r, any gDA mechanism
ϕ, any δs(r) satisfying the conditions in the statement of Lemma 1.a, every (ρ
ϕ, r)-stable
matching is also (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stable.
Proof of Fact 3 . Let µ be a (ρϕ, r)-stable matching. i′, i′′ 6∈ µs by Facts 1 and 2 and
the assumption that i′, i′′ 6∈ ϕs(ρ, r). The only potential (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-blocking pairs
against µ are (s, i′) and (s, i′′) since the only difference between r and (δs(r), r−s) is the
positions of i′ and i′′ in rs. Since (1) both µ and ϕ(ρ, r) are (ρ
ϕ, r)-stable and (2) min{ρϕi′s +
ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} > ρ
ϕ
is + ris for all i with Dis(r) = 1, Facts 1 and 2 imply that for any i ∈ µs,
ρϕis + ris < min{ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} = min{ρ
ϕ
i′s + δi′s(r), ρ
ϕ
i′′s + δi′′s(r)}, where the last
equality comes from ρϕi′s = ρ
ϕ
i′′s. Neither (s, i
′) nor (s, i′′) thus (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-blocks µ.
Fact 4. Under any assignment problem, any lottery number profile r, any gDA mechanism
ϕ that is strategy-proof for schools, any δs(r) satisfying the conditions in the statement of
Lemma 1.a, every (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stable matching is also (ρ
ϕ, r)-stable.
Proof of Fact 4 . Suppose to the contrary that µ is (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stable but not (ρ
ϕ, r)-
stable. I show that it contradicts the assumption that ϕ is strategy-proof for schools.
Step 1.1. Either student i′ or i′′ (but not both) is in µs.
Proof of Step 1.1. Case i : Suppose that neither i′ nor i′′ (but not both) is in µs. By
the (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stability of µ, neither (s, i
′) or (s, i′′) does (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-block µ.
Either (s, i′) or (s, i′′) does (ρϕ, r)-blocks µ, since (1) µ is (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stable and so
individually rational and (2) the only difference between r and (δs(r), r−s) is the positions
of i′ and i′′ in rs. That is, there exists i ∈ µs such that min{ρϕi′s + ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} <
ρϕis + ris < min{ρ
ϕ
i′s + δi′s(r), ρ
ϕ
i′′s + δi′′s(r)} = min{ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s}, a contradiction.
Case ii : Suppose that both i′ and i′′ are in µs. Since µ is not (ρ
ϕ, r)-stable but is
individually rational (by its (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stability), there exists i such that s i µi
and ρϕis + ris < max{ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} = max{ρ
ϕ
i′s + δi′s(r), ρ
ϕ
i′′s + δi′′s(r)}, a
contradiction to the (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stability of µ.
Step 1.2. ϕs(r) 6= ϕs(δs(r), r−s).
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Proof of Step 1.2. i′, i′′ 6∈ ϕs(r) (by assumption), either i′ or i′′ is in µs (by Step
1.1), and Fact 3 implies that (ρϕ, r)-stable ϕs(r) is (ρ
ϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stable. Thus,
Facts 1 and 2 implies that for any ϕδs responsive with respect to (cs, ρϕs , (δs(r), r−s)),
it holds that ϕs(r) ϕδs µs, where I use the fact that µ is not (ρϕ, r)-stable and so
µ 6= ϕ(r). Fact 1 implies that for any ϕδs responsive with respect to (cs, ρϕs , (δs(r), r−s)),
it holds that µs ϕδs ϕs(δs(r), r−s). The two preference relations ϕs(r) ϕδs µs and
µs ϕδs ϕs(δs(r), r−s) jointly imply that for any ϕδs responsive with respect to
(cs, ρ
ϕ
s , (δs(r), r−s)), ϕs(r) ϕδs ϕs(δs(r), r−s), implying ϕs(r) 6= ϕs(δs(r), r−s).
Step 1.3. ϕs(r) ϕs ϕs(δs(r), r−s) for some preferenceδs responsive with respect to (cs, ρs, δs(r)),
a contradiction to the assumption that ϕ is strategy-proof for schools.
Proof of Step 1.3. Take any s responsive with respect to (cs, ρs, rs). If ϕs(δs(r), r−s) s
ϕs(r), then it is a contradiction to the assumption that ϕ is strategy-proof for schools.
This implies ϕs(r) s ϕs(δs(r), r−s) since ϕs(r) 6= ϕs(δs(r), r−s) as shown in Step 1.2.
Note that s is also responsive with respect to (cs, ρs, δs(r)) since (1) the only difference
between r and (δs(r), r−s) is the positions of i
′ and i′′ in rs, and (2) i
′, i′′ 6∈ ϕs(r) by
assumption. Therefore, ϕs(r) ϕs ϕs(δs(r), r−s) for some δs responsive with respect to
(cs, ρs, δs(r)).
Facts 3 and 4 imply that under any assignment problem, any lottery number profile
r, any gDA mechanism ϕ that is strategy-proof for schools, any δs(r) satisfying the con-
ditions in the statement of Lemma 1.a, the set of (ρϕ, r)-stable matchings coincides with
the set of (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stable matchings. Each student or school except s has the
same set of responsive preferences over these common stable matchings both under r and
(δs(r), r−s). School s also has the same preference over these stable matchings both under r
and (δs(r), r−s) since (1) the only difference between r and (δs(r), r−s) is the positions of i
′
and i′′ in rs, and (2) min{ρϕi′s + ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} > ρ
ϕ
is + ris for all i with Dis(r) = 1 and thus
Di′s(r) = Di′′s(r) = 0, which in turn implies i
′, i′′ 6∈ µs for any (ρϕ, r)- or (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-
stable matching µ. Therefore, the school pessimal (ρϕ, r)-stable matching is the same as the
school pessimal (ρϕ, (δs(r), r−s))-stable matching, i.e., ϕ(r) = ϕ(δs(r), r−s).
b) Under r or (δs(r), r−s), let t0 be the step in the DA algorithm at which either i
′ or i′′ or
both first apply for s. If there is no such a step t0 under either r or (δs(r), r−s), then the DA
algorithm works in the same way until its end both under r and (δs(r), r−s), completing the
proof. Assume the existence of such a step t0 under both r and (δs(r), r−s). Until step t0−1,
the DA algorithm operates in the same way both under r and (δs(r), r−s) since the only
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difference between the two situations is the positions of i′ and i′′ in rs. t0 is thus common
to r and (δs(r), r−s). Let Ist0 be the set of students who are kept by s from step t0 − 1 or
newly apply for s in step t0. Ist0 is again the same between r and (δs(r), r−s). There are a
few cases to consider.
Case I : Both i′ and i′′ apply for s at step t0. Under r, s tentatively accepts both i
′ and i′′
by the assumption that there exists i with Dis(r) = 1 such that max{ρϕi′s+ ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s+ ri′′s} ≤
ρϕis + ris. Under (δs(r), r−s), s again tentatively accepts both i
′ and i′′. This is because
{ρϕis + ris}i∈Ist0 = {ρ
ϕ
is + δi(rs)}i∈Ist0 (recall i
′, i′′ ∈ Ist0 by assumption and Ist0 is the same
between r and (δs(r), r−s)) and the above fact that s tentatively accepts both i
′ and i′′ under







th({ρϕis + ris}i∈Ist0 ) where cs-th(·) is the cs-th order statistic. The DA algorithm also works
in the same way for the remaining steps.
Case II : Only one of i′ or i′′ applies for s at step t0. Without loss of generality, suppose
only i′ applies for s at step t0. Under r, s tentatively accepts i
′ by the assumption that there
exists i with Dis(r) = 1 such that ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s ≤ max{ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} ≤ ρ
ϕ
is + ris.
Case II.A: ri′s > ri′′s (and so δi′s(r) < δi′′s(r)). Under (δs(r), r−s), s also tentatively
accepts i′ by the following reason. By the above fact that s tentatively accepts i′ under r,
it holds that ρϕi′s + ri′s ≤ cs-th({ρ
ϕ
is + ris}i∈Ist0 ), implying ρ
ϕ
i′s + δi′s(r) < ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s ≤ cs-
th({ρϕis + δis(r)}i∈Ist0 ).
Case II.B : ri′s < ri′′s. Under (δs(r), r−s), s also tentatively accepts i
′ by the following
reason. Suppose not. Then cs-th({ρϕis+ris}i∈Ist0 ) ≤ cs-th({ρ
ϕ
is+δi(rs)}i∈Ist0 ) < ρ
ϕ
i′s+δi′s(r) =
ρϕi′′s + ri′′s, where the first inequality ri′s < ri′′s and the last equality uses the assumption
ρϕi′s = ρ
ϕ
i′′s. Let’s call cs-th({ρ
ϕ
is + ris}i∈Ist0 ) the tentative cutoff for school s at step t0, which
is common between r and (δs(r), r−s) since Ist0 is the same between r and (δs(r), r−s) and
ris = δis(r) for all i ∈ Ist \ i′. Since the tentative cutoff is monotonically decreasing in
steps, the above inequality implies that for all i with Dis(r) = 1, ρ
ϕ
is + ris < ρ
ϕ
i′s + δi′s(r) =
ρϕi′′s + ri′′s, contradicting the assumption that there exists i with Dis(r) = 1 such that
ρϕi′′s + ri′′s ≤ max{ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} ≤ ρ
ϕ
is + ris.
In all cases, the DA algorithm works in the same way at step t0 under r and (δs(r), r−s).
In Case I, the DA algorithm also works in the same way for the remaining steps. In Case
II, let t1 be the step in the DA algorithm at which i
′′ first applies for s. If there is no such
a step t1 under either r or (δs(r), r−s), then the DA algorithm works in the same way until
its end both under r and (δs(r), r−s), completing the proof. Assume the existence of such a
step t1 under both r and (δs(r), r−s). Until step t1 − 1, the DA algorithm operates in the
same way both under r and (δs(r), r−s) since the only difference between the two situations
is the positions of i′ and i′′ in rs. t1 is thus common to r and (δs(r), r−s). Let Ist1 be the set
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of students who are kept by s from step t1 − 1 or newly apply for s in step t1. Ist1 is again
the same between r and (δs(r), r−s). I again consider the following two cases.
Case II.A (Continued): ri′s > ri′′s. Under (δs(r), r−s), s also tentatively accepts i
′′ by
the following reason. Suppose not. Then cs-th({ρϕis+ ris}i∈Ist1 ) ≤ cs-th({ρ
ϕ
is+ δi(rs)}i∈Ist1 ) <
ρϕi′′s+ δi′′s(r) = ρ
ϕ
i′s+ ri′s. Since the tentative cutoff is monotonically decreasing in steps, the
above inequality implies that for all i with Dis(r) = 1, ρ
ϕ
is + ris < ρ
ϕ
i′s + δi′s(r) = ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s,
contradicting the assumption that there exists i with Dis(r) = 1 such that ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s ≤
max{ρϕi′s + ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} ≤ ρ
ϕ
is + ris.
Case II.B (Continued): ri′s < ri′′s. By the above fact that s tentatively accepts i
′′
under r, it holds that ρϕi′′s + ri′′s ≤ cs-th({ρ
ϕ
is + ris}i∈Ist1 ), implying ρ
ϕ
i′′s + δi′′s(r) < cs-
th({ρϕis + δis(r)}i∈Ist1 ).
In both cases, the DA algorithm works in the same way at step t1 under r and (δs(r), r−s).
Since both i0 and i1 have already applies for s by step t1 or never apply for s, the DA
algorithm also works in the same way for the remaining steps.
Main Proof
Suppose that the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment for gDA
mechanism ϕ for some school s at some assignment problem X. Fix ϕ, s, and X throughout.
For each lottery number profile r, define students i0(r) and i1(r) by
• i0(r), i1(r) ∈ Firsts(r)
• Di0(r)s(r) = 0 and Di1(r)s(r) = 1
• ri0(r)s ≤ ris for all i ∈ Firsts(r) with Dis(r) = 0
• ri1(r)s ≥ ris for all i ∈ Firsts(r) with Dis(r) = 1.
If there are no two students satisfying the conditions, let i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅. With this
convention, i0(r) and i1(r) are uniquely well-defined for all r. (If there are two î0(r) 6= ĩ0(r)
satisfying the conditions, then rî0(r)s > rĩ0(r)s and rî0(r)s < rĩ0(r)s, a contradiction. The same
logic holds for i1(r) too.) This proof uses the following equivalent representation of gDA
mechanism ϕ.
Definition 6. Algorithm 2STAGES(r) operates in the following way.
(1) Same as in Definition 1.
(2) Same as in Definition 1.
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(3) Run the following sub-algorithm STAGE1(r): Remove i0(r) and i1(r) from X (without
changing anything else) and run the DA algorithm on the remaining subproblem where
schools’ strict priorities are given by (ϕrs).
(4) Starting from the output of STAGE1(r) as the initial tentative assignment, run the
following sub-algorithm STAGE2(r): Include i0(r) and i1(r) and run the DA algorithm
where schools’ strict priorities are given by (ϕrs).
By McVitie and Wilson (1970)’s order irrelevance result, 2STAGES(r) and ϕ(r) (the simplified
notation for ϕ(ρ, r)) produce the same matching for all r. Let t − 1 be the last step of
STAGE1(r) at which STAGE1(r) stops and µt−1(r) ≡ (µst−1(r))s∈S be the tentative matching
at the end of step t− 1. Start counting STAGE2(r)’s steps without resetting the step index,
and let t be the first step of STAGE2(r). (Note that t implicitly depends on r.)
For each lottery number profile r, define σ∗(r) = (σ∗s′(r))s′∈S as the following permutation
of r. If i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅, then σ∗(r) = r. Otherwise, if gDA mechanism ϕ uses MTB, σ∗(r)
is obtained by switching only i0(r) and i1(r) only in rs, i.e.,
• σ∗i0(r)s(r) = ri1(r)s
• σ∗i1(r)s(r) = ri0(r)s
• σ∗is(r) = ris for all i 6= i0(r), i1(r)
• σ∗is′(r) = rs′ for all s′ 6= s.
If ϕ uses STB, σ∗(r) is obtained by switching i0(r) and i1(r) in rs′ for all s
′, i.e., for all s′
• σ∗i0(r)s′(r) = ri1(r)s′
• σ∗i1(r)s′(r) = ri0(r)s′
• σ∗is′(r) = ris′ for all i 6= i0(r), i1(r).
I say two students i′ and i′′ are consecutive in rs within Firsts(r) if i
′, i′′ ∈ Firsts(r)
and there is no i′′′ ∈ Firsts(r) such that ri′s < ri′′′s < ri′′s or ri′s > ri′′′s > ri′′s. For each r,
consider a permutation σ̂s(r) 6= σ∗s(r) of rs that switches only two students i′ and i′′ who are
consecutive in rs within Firsts(r). If there are no such i
′ and i′′, let σ̂s(r) = rs. Let σ̂(r) be
the following. If ϕ uses MTB, let σ̂(r) = (σ̂s(r), r−s). If ϕ uses STB, let σ̂(r) = ×|S|σ̂s(r).
Lemma 2. (A breakdown of the Fisher property discussed in Section 3.3) There exits lottery
number profile r consistent with gDA mechanism ϕ’s lottery structure (STB or MTB) such
that Di0(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0 or Dis(σ̂(r)) 6= Dis(r) for some student i ∈ Firsts(r).
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Proof of Lemma 2. It is enough to show that if there is no r such that there exists
i ∈ Firsts(r) such that Dis(σ̂(r)) 6= Dis(r), then there exits r such that Di0(r)s(σ∗(r)) =
Di1(r)s(σ




Step 2.A. For all lottery number profile r with i0(r) 6= ∅ and i1(r) 6= ∅, Di0(r)s(σ∗(r)) =
1, Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0, and Dis(σ
∗(r)) = Dis(r) for all student i ∈ Firsts(r) with i 6= i0(r) and
i 6= i1(r).
Proof of Step 2.A. By the above assumption that for all r, it is not the case
Di0(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0, it is enough to show that for all such r,
Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0 and Dis(σ
∗(r)) = Dis(r) for all i ∈ Firsts(r) with i 6= i0(r) and
i 6= i1(r). Let me consider STAGE1(r) and STAGE1(σ∗(r)). Since everything except
i0(r) and i1(r)’s lottery numbers is the same between r and σ
∗(r), both STAGE1(r) and
STAGE1(σ∗(r)) produce the same tentative assignment µst−1(r) = µst−1(σ
∗(r)) ≡ µst−1.
Now start STAGE2(r) and STAGE2(σ∗(r)). Under r, McVitie and Wilson (1970)’s or-
der irrelevance result implies s rejects i0(r) and tentatively accepts i1(r), which implies
ρϕi0(r)s+ri0(r)s > cs-th({ρ
ϕ
is+ris}i∈µst−1∪i0(r)∪i1(r)) where cs-th(·) is the cs-th order statistic
in the input set. Under σ∗(r), by definition of σ∗(r), ρϕi1(r)s+σ
∗
i1(r)s
(r) = ρϕi0(r)s+ ri0(r)s >
cs-th({ρϕis+ris}i∈µst−1∪i0(r)∪i1(r)), resulting in s’s rejecting i1(r). Since any rejected student
is never be accepted in the DA algorithm, this implies Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0. Dis(σ
∗(r)) =
Dis(r) for all i ∈ Firsts(r) with i 6= i0(r) and i 6= i1(r) by the following reason. Suppose
not. There exists i ∈ µst−1 ∩ Firsts(r) \ {i0(r), i1(r)} for whom, without loss of general-
ity, Dis(σ
∗(r)) = 0 and Dis(r) = 1. This implies that Di0(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0
since ρϕis + ris < ρ
ϕ
i1(r)s
+ ri1(r)s < ρ
ϕ
i0(r)s
+ ri0(r)s (the first inequality is by definition of







+ σ∗i0(r)s(r) < ρ
ϕ
i1(r)s
+ σ∗i1(r)s(r). This is a contradiction
to the assumption that for all r, it is not the case Di0(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0.
Step 2.B. For all lottery number profile r with i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅, it holds ϕ(σ∗(r)) = ϕ(r). For
each r and each permutation σ̂(r) 6= σ∗(r) defined right before Lemma 2, Dis(σ̂(r)) = Dis(r)
for all i ∈ Firsts(r).
Proof of Step 2.B. For all r with i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅, σ∗(r) = r and it is trivial that
ϕ(σ∗(r)) = ϕ(r). The second part is by assumption.
Step 2.C. For each lottery number profile r, define os(r) ≡ |{i ∈ Firsts(r)|Dis(r) = 1}|. For
each r and each permutation σs(r) of rs that permutes lottery numbers only among members
of Firsts(r), let σ(r) be the following. If ϕ uses MTB, σ(r) = (σs(r), r−s). If ϕ uses STB,
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σ(r) = ×|S|σs(r). Then the following is true for all r.
(1) Firsts(σ(r)) = Firsts(r).
(2) os(σ(r)) = os(r).
(3) For all i and i′ in Firsts(σ(r)), if Dis(σ(r)) > Di′s(σ(r)), then σis(r) < σi′s(r).
Proof of Step 2.C. Since any permutation can be expressed as a composition of
contrapositions (permutations switching consecutive two elements), I can express any σ
as a composition of σ∗ and σ̂’s defined right before Lemma 2. Steps 2.A and 2.B imply
(1) and (2). (3) follows from the fact that for all r and all i, i′ ∈ Firsts(r), ρϕis = ρ
ϕ
i′s
and another well-known property of the DA algorithm that for applicants who rank s
first and share ρϕis, Dis is monotonically decreasing in ris (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999).
Let R be the set of all possible values of r. Partition R into R1,R2, ...,RN such that
within each Rn, for all r, r′ ∈ Rn, r can be obtained from r′ by permutation r′ = σ(r), where
σ(r) is a permutation of r defined in Step 2.C. This partition is well-defined by Step 2.C(1):
Since Step 2.C(1) guarantees Firsts(r) = Firsts(r
′), r′ = σ(r) for such a permutation σ
if and only if r = σ(r′) for such a (possibly different) permutation σ. Let rn be a generic
element of Rn. Note that Firsts(rn) and os(rn) are the same for all rn ∈ Rn by Step 2.C(1)
and 2.C(2), respectively. Step 2.C guarantees that conditional on each Rn, Dis(R) is inde-
pendent of i’s type for all i ∈ Firsts(rn), i.e., for all n, and θ,




which is independent of θi = θ. The equality holds since Firsts(rn) and os(rn) stay constant
across all rn ∈ Rn and under each rn, students with the os(rn)-best lottery numbers have
Dis(rn) = 1. Therefore, for all j ∈ Firsts(r0),





if ρϕis = ρ
ϕ
js for any j ∈ Firsts(rn)
1 if ρϕis < ρ
ϕ






if Firsts(r0) = Firsts(rn)
1 if ρϕis < ρ
ϕ




where the second last equality holds because ρϕis = ρ
ϕ
js for any j ∈ Firsts(rn) if and only if
Firsts(r0) = Firsts(rn). pn is independent of θj. This implies that for all j ∈ Firsts(r0)
P (Dis(R) = 1|i ∈ Firsts(r0), θi = θ)
= ΣNn=1P (Dis(R) = 1|i ∈ Firsts(r0), R ∈ Rn, θi = θ)× P (R ∈ Rn|i ∈ Firsts(r0), θi = θ)
(by the law of total probability)
= ΣNn=1pn × P (R ∈ Rn),
which is again independent of θi = θ.Thus the first-choice research design extracts a random
assignment, a contradiction. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Remark 1. Under the alternative definition of a random assignment in Section 5.1, this part
simplifies to the following. No other part of the proof depends on which random assignment
definition I use.
P (Dis(R) = 1|i ∈ Firsts(R), θi = θ)




× |{r ∈ Rn|i ∈ Firsts(r)}|
|{r ∈ R|i ∈ Firsts(r)}|
,
which is independent of θi = θ conditional on i ∈ Firsts(R).
Case 1: There exists lottery number profile r consistent with gDA mechanism ϕ’s lottery
structure (STB or MTB) such that Di0(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0. For each r, define r∗s
as the following permutation of rs. If i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅, let r∗s = rs. Otherwise, let











= ρϕi1(r)s and Dis(r) = 1}
• r∗i0(r)s > r
∗
i1(r)s
and there is no such i that ρϕis = ρ
ϕ
i0(r)s
= ρϕi1(r)s and r
∗
i0(r)s
> r∗is > r
∗
i1(r)s








i 6= i0(r), i 6= i1(r), j 6= i0(r), and j 6= i1(r).
For each lottery number profile r and each school s′ 6= s, define σ̃s′(r) as the following
permutation of rs′ . (Note that σ̃s′(r) implicitly depends on whole r.) If i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅ or
MTB is used by ϕ, then σ̃s′(r) = rs′ . Otherwise, σ̃s′(r) is obtained by moving i1(r) to right
above i0(r), i.e.,
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• σ̃i1(r)s′(r) = max{ris′|ris′ < ri0(r)s′}
• σ̃is′(r) > σ̃js′(r) if and only if ris′ > rjs′ for all students i, j such that i, j 6= i1(r).
Lemma 3. (Outcome-equivalence between lottery number profiles r and (r∗s , σ̃−s(r))) For
all lottery number profile r, ϕ(r) = ϕ(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)). Therefore, Di0(r)s(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) = 0(=
Di0(r)s(r)) and Di1(r)s(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) = 1(= Di1(r)s(r)).
Proof of Lemma 3. The following Steps 3.A and 3.B imply Lemma 3.
Step 3.A. For all lottery number profile r, ϕ(r) = ϕ(r∗s , r−s).
Proof of Step 3.A. If i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅ and so r∗s = rs, the above equality is trivial.
Otherwise, r∗s is obtained from rs through a composition of two permutations. The first





all i′, i′′ ∈ I1 and there exists i with Dis(r) = 1 such that maxi′∈I1{ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s} ≤ ρ
ϕ
is + ris.
The second permutation permutes lottery numbers only among students in some set I0
such that ρϕi′s = ρ
ϕ
i′′s for all i
′, i′′ ∈ I0 and mini′∈I0{ρ
ϕ
i′s + ri′s} > ρ
ϕ
is + ris for all i with
Dis(r) = 1. The first permutation is a composition of special permutations δ satisfying
the conditions in Lemma 1.b. If ϕ is not strategy-proof for schools, then the proof of
Theorem 1 is complete. If ϕ is strategy-proof for schools, the second permutation is a
composition of special permutations δ satisfying the conditions in Lemma 1.a. Therefore
Lemma 1 implies Step 2.A.
Step 3.B. For all lottery number profile r, ϕ(r∗s , r−s) = ϕ(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)).
Proof of Step 3.B. If i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅ and so σ̃−s(r) = r−s, the above inequality is
trivial. Otherwise, at the first step of the DA algorithm constituting ϕ, students apply
for schools in the same way both under (r∗s , r−s) and (r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)). In particular, i1(r)
applies for s since i1(r) ∈ Firsts(r). Schools also tentatively accept students in the
same way both under (r∗s , r−s) and (r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)): s does so since s has the same strict
priority ϕr∗s both under (r
∗
s , r−s) and (r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)). The other schools also do so since
the only possible difference between ϕrs′ and 
ϕ
σ̃s′ (r)
is the position of i1(r), who applies
for s. As a result, since Step 2.A implies Di1(r)s(r
∗
s , r−s) = 1, s tentatively accepts i1(r)
at the first step of the DA algorithm both under (r∗s , r−s) and (r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)). Since (a) s
has the same preference ϕr∗s both under (r
∗
s , r−s) and (r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)), (b) the only possible
difference between ϕrs′ and 
ϕ
σ̃s′ (r)
is the position of i1(r), and (c) i1(r) is tentatively
kept by s and is never be rejected by s under (r∗s , r−s), the DA algorithm operates in
the same way for the remaining steps, producing the same matching.
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Lemma 4. (Partial outcome-equivalence between σ∗(r) and (σ∗s(r
∗
s , r−s), σ̃−s(r))) For all lot-
tery number profile r with Di0(r)s (σ
∗(r)) = Di1(r)s(σ









s , r−s), σ̃−s (r)) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. If i0(r) = i1(r) = ∅ and so σ∗(r) = r = (σ∗s(r∗s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)), Lemma 4 is
immediate. Otherwise, I first prove the following result.
Step 4.A. For all lottery number profile r with Di0(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = Di1(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0, it is the
case ϕ(σ∗(r)) = ϕ(σ∗s(r
∗
s , r−s), σ
∗
−s(r)).
Proof of Step 4.A. Note that
a) σ∗i0(r)s(r) = ri1(r)s ≤ min{ri0(r)s, r
∗
i0(r)s





s , r−s), σ
∗
i0(r)s
(r∗s , r−s)}, where the last equality follows from i0(r∗s , r−s) = i0(r) and i1(r∗s , r−s) = i1(r)
by Step 2.A.











and σ∗js(r) > σ
∗
i0(r)s
(r) and all i
with Dis(σ
∗(r)) = 1 since Di0(r)s(σ
∗(r)) = 0 by assumption and i0(r) ∈ Firsts(r) and so
i0(r) ranks s first.
(a) and (b) imply that starting from σ∗(r), σ∗s(r
∗
s , r−s) is obtained from σ
∗
s(r) through
a permutation that permutes lottery numbers only among students in some set I0 such
that ρϕi′s = ρ
ϕ
i′′s for all i








is(r) for all i with
Dis(σ
∗(r)) = 1. This permutation is a composition of special permutations δ’s that
satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1.a. Therefore Lemma 1 implies Step 4.A.
Now let me compare ϕ(σ∗s(r
∗






s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)). At the first step
of the DA algorithm constituting ϕ, students apply for schools in the same way both under
(σ∗s(r
∗






s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)). In particular, i0(r) and i1(r) apply for s since
i0(r), i1(r) ∈ Firsts(r). Schools also tentatively accept students in the same way both under
(σ∗s(r
∗






s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)): s does so since s has the same strict priority










s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)). The other schools also
do so since the only possible differences between ϕσ∗
s′ (r)
and ϕσ̃s′ (r) are the positions of i0(r)
and i1(r), both of whom apply for s.
If s rejects both i0(r) and i1(r) at the first step, the proof is complete. Otherwise, s










s , r−s). Since
ϕσ∗
s′ (r)
and ϕσ̃s′ (r) are equivalent over I \ {i0(r)}, the remaining steps of the DA algorithm
operate in the same way both under (σ∗s(r
∗






s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)) until the

















s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)). This implies Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. (Existence of a profitable preference manipulation) There exist (ρ∗, r∗), school s’s
preference s responsive with respect to (cs, ρ∗s, r∗s), and (ρ′s, r′s) such that ϕs((ρ′s, r′s), (ρ∗−s, r∗−s))
s ϕs(ρ∗, r∗).
Proof of Lemma 5. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 imply that there exists r such that
• Di0(r)s(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) = 0
• Di1(r)s(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) = 1
• Di0(r)s(σ∗s(r∗s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)) = Di1(r)s(σ∗s(r∗s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)) = 0.
Step 5.A. ϕs(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) = µst(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) where µst(·) is s’s tentative assignment at the end
of step t in 2STAGES(r).
Proof of Step 5.A. Execute STAGE1(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) and start STAGE2(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)).
s rejects i0(r) and tentatively keeps i1(r) since Di0(r)s(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) = 0 and
Di1(r)s(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) = 1. Suppose to the contrary ϕs(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) 6= µst(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)).
Since |ϕs(r∗s , σ̃−s(r))| = |µst(r∗s , σ̃−s(r))| = cs (because s rejects i0(r) when choosing
µst(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) at step t), this implies there exists a student i2 ∈ ϕs(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) such that
i2 6∈ µst(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)). In addition, i2 6∈ µst−1(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) ∪ i1(r) has to be the case since
otherwise (i.e., if i2 6∈ µst(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) but i2 ∈ µst−1(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) ∪ i1(r) and so i2 applies
for s at step t′ < t in STAGE1(r∗s , σ̃−s(r))), s rejects i2 at step t and so i2 6∈ ϕs(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)),
a contradiction. This means i2 applies for s at a step t
′ > t and is tentatively kept by
s. This requires that s rejects i1(r) before or at step t
′ since by definition i ϕr∗s i1(r) for
any i ∈ µst(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) \ i1(r), which is because s rejects i0(r) at step t and there is no
such i that ρϕis = ρ
ϕ
i0(r)s
= ρϕi1(r)s and r
∗
i0(r)s
> r∗is > r
∗
i1(r)s
. This is a contradiction to the
above fact that Di1(r)s(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) = 1.
Step 5.B. There exists a step t′ > t in 2STAGES(σ∗s(r
∗











Proof of Step 5.B. Execute STAGE1(σ∗s(r
∗





σ̃−s(r)). School s rejects i1(r) and tentatively keeps i0(r) at step t since (1) µst−1 is













, and (3) Di1(r)s(r
∗




s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)) = 0, school
47
s rejects i0(r) at a later step t
′ > t and tentatively keeps i2 with i2 ϕσ∗s (r∗s ,r−s) i0(r), which





s , r−s) = ρ
ϕ
i1(r)s
+ r∗i1(r)s and σ
∗
i2s








s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)) = µst(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r))∪ i2 \ i1(r) where i2 is a student with
i2 ϕr∗s i1(r).
I am ready to construct a profitable preference manipulation for s. Let s be any prefer-




s be a coarse priority order for s
such that ρ′ks > ρ
′
js for all k 6∈ ∪tt0=1µst0(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r))∪ i2 \ i1(r) and j ∈ ∪tt0=1µst0(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r))∪
i2 \ i1(r) while ρ′ks = ρ′js if and only if ρks = ρjs for all j, k 6∈ µst(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) ∪ i2 \ i1(r) or







s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)) = µst(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) ∪ i2 \ i1(r).
Also, i2 ϕr∗s i1(r) established in Step 5.B implies i2 r∗s i1(r) as follows:
i2 ϕr∗s i1(r)









(since ranki1(r)s = 1 ≤ ranki2s and gϕ(·) is weakly increasing)
⇔ ρi2s + r∗i2s < ρi1(r)s + r
∗
i1(r)s
(since fϕ(·) is strictly increasing)







s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)) = µst(r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r)) ∪ i2 \ i1(r) s µst(r∗s , σ̃−s(r)) =
ϕs(ρ, (r
∗
s , σ̃−s(r))) sinces is responsive with respect to (cs, ρs, r∗s), showing that when (ρs, r∗s)




s , r−s)) is a profitable manipulation for s with respect
to any s responsive with respect to (cs, ρs, r∗s); therefore ϕ is not strategy-proof for s at X.
Figure 3 summarizes the structure of the above proof.
Case 2: There exist r consistent with ϕ’s lottery structure (STB or MTB) and i ∈ Firsts(r)
such that Dis(σ̂(r)) 6= Dis(r) where σ̂(r) is a permutation defined right before Lemma 2, i.e.,
a permutation that switches only two students i′ and i′′ who are consecutive in rs within
Firsts(r). By the definition of σ̂(r), it is the case Di′s(r) = Di′′s(r). There are two cases to
consider.
Case 2.a: Di′s(r) = Di′′s(r) = 1. Then there exists j with Dis(r) = 1 such that max{ρϕi′s +
ri′s, ρ
ϕ
i′′s + ri′′s} ≤ ρ
ϕ
js + rjs. If ϕ uses MTB, σ̂(r) satisfies the conditions in Lemma 1.b,
implying ϕ(σ̂(r)) = ϕ(r) by Lemma 1.b. This is a contradiction to Dis(σ̂(r)) 6= Dis(r).
If ϕ uses STB, suppose to the contrary that Di′s(r) = Di′′s(r) = 1. At the first step of the
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Figure 3: Structure of the proof (Case 1)
The first-choice research design does not extracts a random assignment
for school s for gDA mechanism ϕ
⇓
(ρ, r)









s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)))
School s relegates “nuisance students”

(ρ, (r∗s , σ̃−s(r)))
Profitable manipulation
for school s (Lemma 5)




s , r−s), σ̃−s(r)))
⇓
gDA mechanism ϕ is not strategy-proof for school s
DA algorithm, students apply for schools in the same way both under r and σ̂(r). In partic-
ular, i′ and i′′ apply for s since i′, i′′ ∈ Firsts(r) and both of them rank s first. Schools also
tentatively accept students in the same way both under r and σ̂(r): The other schools than
s do so since the only possible differences between ϕrs′ and 
ϕ
σ̂s′ (r)
are the positions of i′ and
i′′, both of whom apply for s. s accepts the same students including i′ and i′′ since Di′s(r) =
Di′′s(r) = 1 and {ρϕjs + rjs|j applies for s at the first step of the DA algorithm under r} =
{ρϕjs + σ̂js(r)|j applies for s at the first step of the DA algorithm under σ̂(r)}, which is be-
cause the same students apply for s both under r and σ̂(r), ρϕjs + rjs = ρ
ϕ
js + σ̂js(r) for all
j 6= i′, i′′, ρϕi′s+ ri′s = ρ
ϕ
i′′s+ σ̂i′′s(r), and ρ
ϕ
i′′s+ ri′′s = ρ
ϕ
i′s+ σ̂i′s(r). Since (a) the only possible
differences between ϕrs′ and 
ϕ
σ̂s′ (r)
are the positions of i′ and i′′, and (b) i′ and i′′ are tenta-
tively kept by s and is never be rejected by s under r, the DA algorithm operates in the same
way for the remaining steps, producing the same matching. This implies Dis(σ̂(r)) = Dis(r)
for all i ∈ Firsts(r), a contradiction.
Case 2.b: Di′s(r) = Di′′s(r) = 0. Without loss of generality, assume that there exist r
and i ∈ Firsts(r) such that Dis(σ̂(r)) = 0 6= 1 = Dis(r). Let i∗ be the student with
i∗ ∈ Firsts(r), Di∗s(r) = 1, and ri∗s ≥ rjs for all j ∈ Firsts(r) with Djs(r) = 1. Until the
end of Case 2.b, change i∗’s preference i∗ to ′i∗ such that s ′i∗ ∅ ′i∗ s′ for all s′ 6= s.
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This does not change Di∗s(r) = 1 or Di′s(r) = Di′′s(r) = 0. Note that Di∗s(σ̂(r)) = 0 6=
1 = Di∗s(r) since Dis(σ̂(r)) = 0 and ρ
ϕ
i∗s + σ̂i∗s(r) = ρ
ϕ
i∗s + ri∗s ≥ ρ
ϕ
is + ris = ρ
ϕ
is + σ̂is(r)
for any i ∈ Firsts(r) with Dis(σ̂(r)) = 0 6= 1 = Dis(r). Without loss of generality, assume
ri′s < ri′′s so that σ̂i′′s(r) < σ̂i′s(r). Let σ̂
#
s (r) be the further permutation of σ̂s(r) such
that σ̂#i′′s(r) = min{σ̂js(r)|j ∈ Firsts(r), Djs(r) = 0}, σ̂
#
i′s(r) = min{σ̂js(r) 6= σ̂
#
i′′s(r)|j ∈
Firsts(r), Djs(r) = 0}, and σ̂#js(r) > σ̂
#
ks(r) if and only if σ̂js(r) > σ̂ks(r) for all j, k ∈
I \ {i′, i′′}.
Lemma 6. Di∗s(σ̂
#
s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = Di′′s(σ̂
#
s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. Note that min{ρϕi′s+ σ̂i′s(r), ρ
ϕ





ρϕi∗s + ri∗s = ρ
ϕ





i′, i′′ ∈ Firsts(r)) and the definition of σ̂s(r) while the middle inequality is by Di∗s(r) = 1
and Di′s(r) = Di′′s(r) = 0. Thus, Di′′s(σ̂(r)) = Di′s(σ̂(r)) = 0. If ϕ is not strategy-proof
for schools, then the proof of Theorem 1 is complete. If ϕ is strategy-proof for schools, by
Lemma 1.a and the definition of σ̂#s (r), it holds ϕ(σ̂
#
s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = ϕ(σ̂(r)), which implies
Lemma 6.
Let σ̂##s (r) be the permutation of σ̂
#
s (r) that switches i






s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 0 and Di′′s(σ̂
##
s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 1.
Proof of Lemma 7. Note that Di∗s(σ̂
#
s (r), r−s) = 1 and Di′′s(σ̂
#
s (r), r−s) = 0 by Lemma 1.a
and the definition of σ̂#s (r). Since the only differences between (σ̂
#
s (r), r−s) and (σ̂
##
s (r), σ̂−s(r))
are the positions of i∗ and i′′ in the priority order at s and the positions of i′ and i′′ in the
priority order at s′ 6= s, both under (σ̂#s (r), r−s) and (σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)), the DA algorithm
operates in the same way until i′ is rejected by s. School s rejects i′ in both scenarios
since Di′′s(σ̂
#
















Since i′ has a weakly worse lottery number under σ̂s′(r) than under rs′ for all s
′ 6= s, i is
less likely to crowd other applicants out from other schools than s and the chain reactions
of new rejections and applications caused by s’s rejection of i′ are less likely to go back
to s under (σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)) than under (σ̂
#
s (r), r−s). Also, since the only other difference
between (σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)) and (σ̂
#
s (r), r−s) is the school-s lottery numbers of i
′′ and i∗ , i.e.,
σ̂#i∗s(r) = σ̂
##









′′ is rejected by s under
(σ̂#s (r), r−s), i
∗ may be rejected by s under (σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)). But i
∗ ranks only s in ′i∗ and
causes no additional rejections at other schools while i′′ may rank other schools than s and
may cause additional rejections at other schools.
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By these two factors, the set of rejections made by schools other than s is weakly larger in
the set inclusion sense under (σ̂#s (r), r−s) than under (σ̂
##
s (r), σ̂−s(r)), i.e., {(j, s′)|Djs′′(σ̂##s
(r), σ̂−s(r)) = 0 for all s
′′ j s′} ⊆ {(j, s′)|Djs′′(σ̂#s (r), r−s) = 0 for all s′′ j s′}. Therefore,
the set of applicants for s is weakly larger in the set inclusion sense under (σ̂#s (r), r−s) than
under (σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)), i.e., {j|Djs′(σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 0 for all s′ j s} ⊆ {j|Djs′(σ̂#s (r), r−s)
= 0 for all s′ j s}. As a result it has to be the case that the cutoff at s is smaller (more
strict) under (σ̂#s (r), r−s) than under (σ̂
##
s (r), σ̂−s(r)), i.e.,
max{ρϕjs + σ̂
##
js (r)|Djs(σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 1}
= cs-th{ρϕjs + σ̂
##
js (r)|Djs′(σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 0 for all s′ j s}
≥ cs-th{ρϕjs + σ̂
#
js(r)|Djs′(σ̂#s (r), r−s) = 0 for all s′ j s}
= max{ρϕjs + σ̂
#
js(r)|Djs(σ̂#s (r), r−s) = 1}
≥ ρϕi∗s + ri∗s
= ρϕi′′s + σ̂
##
i′′s (r),
where the first inequality is by {j|Djs′(σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 0 for all s′ j s} ⊆ {j|Djs′(σ̂#s (r),
r−s) = 0 for all s
′ j s} (shown above), the second inequality is by Di∗s(σ̂#s (r), r−s) = 1
(shown at the start of this proof), and the last equality is by the definition of σ̂##i′′s (r). cs-th{·}
is the cs-th order statistic. This implies Di′′s(σ̂
##
s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 1 (by i
′′ ∈ Firsts(r)). This
also impliesDi∗s(σ̂
##
s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 0 since otherwiseDi∗s(σ̂
#
s (r), σ̂−s(r)) =Di′′s(σ̂
#
s (r), σ̂−s(r))
= 1 by Lemma 1.b, a contradiction to Di∗s(σ̂
#
s (r), σ̂−s(r)) = 0 in Lemma 6.
Lemmas 6 and 7 imply gDA mechanism ϕ is not strategy-proof for schools by the same
argument as Case 1 where students i′′ and i∗ perform the roles of students i1(r) and i0(r),
respectively, in Case 1 while the permutation from lottery number profile (σ̂##s (r), σ̂−s(r)) to
(σ̂#s (r), σ̂−s(r)) performs the role of the permutation from lottery number profile r to σ
∗(r)
in Case 1.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1.b
Proof. Consider a special case of the proof of Theorem 1 where I suppose that the first-
choice research design does not extract a random assignment for the DA mechanism with
STB when there are no priorities, i.e., ρis = ρjs for all i, j, and s. By the STB lottery
structure, ris′ = ris′′ for all i, s
′, and s′′, and the order of ris is the same as the order of ρ
ϕ
is
for any s. In this case, Case 2 never happens and only Case 1 is relevant. In Case 1, by
the no-priority and STB assumptions, r∗s = σ̃s′(r) for all s
′ 6= s. This implies that under
the preferences induced by (ρ, (r∗s , σ̃−s(r))), all schools share the same preference as s’s r∗s .
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s , r−s)) is a profitable preference manipulation for s with
respect to r∗s . This contradicts the fact that for the DA mechanism, truth-telling is optimal
for s when all the other schools report the same preference as s’s true preference. (For a
formal proof of this well-known fact, see Hatfield et al. (2016) Proposition 4 and Lemma
1.) Therefore, for problems with no priorities, the first-choice research design must extract
a random assignment for the DA mechanism with STB.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Take any three schools and label them as A,B, and C. Consider any student prefer-
ence profile that can be written as follows for some k 6= l and k, l ≥ 1:
1: B,A, ∅
2, ...,k: B, ∅
k+1: C,A, ∅
k+2, ...,k+l: C, ∅
ρA, ρB, ρC : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Without loss of generality, assume l > k. If k = 1, set k: B,A, ∅. The capacity of each
school is 1 while the treatment school is A. Since both students 1 and k + 1 rank A second
and have the same priority at A, for any gDA mechanism ϕ, we have
ρϕ1A ≡ fϕ(ρ1A) + gϕ(rank1A) = fϕ(ρk+1,A) + gϕ(rankk+1,A) ≡ ρ
ϕ
k+1,A,
which I denote by ρ. Nevertheless, it turns out that for any gDA mechanism with any lottery
structure,
P (ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1) < P (ZiA(R) = 1|ρ
ϕ
iA = ρ, θi = θk+1).
To see this, note that for any gDA mechanism, student 1 is assigned to B with probability
1
k
since only students 1 to k rank B, and all of them rank B first so that for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., k},
ρϕiB ≡ fϕ(ρiB) + gϕ(rankiB) = fϕ(ρjB) + gϕ(rankjB) ≡ ρ
ϕ
jB.





on these facts, I first analyze any gDA mechanism with STB by considering the following
cases.
Case i : Neither student 1 nor k + 1 applies for A, i.e., 1 and k + 1 are assigned B and









, student k + 1 is assigned to C with probability
1
l
, and these two
events are independent since there is no overlap between applicants for B and those for C
so that {RiB| i ranks B} and {RiC | i ranks C} are independent. In this case, no student
applies for A, and A is undersubscribed. Recall that I define ZiA(r) = 1 for all i if there
is no j with DjA(r) = 1. Both students 1 and k + 1 are therefore qualified for A, i.e.,
Z1A(r) = Zk+1,A(r) = 1.
Case ii : Only student k+1 applies for A. This case happens with probability
1
k
× l − 1
l
. In
this case, student k + 1 is always assigned to A and qualified for A. By ρϕ1A = ρ
ϕ
k+1,A shown
above and the fact that student k + 1 gets the single seat at A, student 1 is qualified for A
(i.e., Z1A(R) = 1) if and only if student 1 has a better lottery number than student k+1 at A
(i.e., R1A < Rk+1,A). Let U [a, b] be a random variable drawn from the uniform distribution
over [a, b], Beta(α, β) be a random variable drawn from the beta distribution with param-
eters (α, β), f(x;α, β) and F (x;α, β) be the pdf and cdf, respectively, of Beta(α, β), and
Γ(·) be the Gamma function. Conditional on Case ii, student 1 has a better lottery num-
ber than student k+1 at A and so qualified there (Z1A(R) = 1) with the following probability.
Pr(R1A < Rk+1,A|D1B(R) = 1, Dk+1,C(R) = 0)
= Pr(min{R1B, ..., RkB} < U [min{Rk+2,C , ..., Rk+l,C}, 1])










F (y; 1, k)× 1
1− x










































× k + l
(1 + k)(l − 1)(k + l − 1)
=
k(k + l)
{Γ(1)}2(1 + k)(k + l − 1)
≡ p1(k, l),
where the second equality is by the STB lottery structure while the first and third equalities
use the following facts, respectively:
• If X ∼ U [0, 1], then the distribution of X conditional on X ≥ x0 is U [x0, 1] where x0
is any constant on [0, 1].
• RiA’s are i.i.d. samples from U [0, 1] while the k-th order statistic of n i.i.d. samples
from U [0, 1] is distributed according to Beta(k, n+ 1− k) (Casella and Berger (2002),
p.230).






the same reason as in Case ii. In this case, 1 is always assigned A and qualified for A. Since
ρϕ1A = ρ
ϕ
k+1,A and student 1 gets the single seat at A, student k + 1 is qualified for A if and
only if student k + 1 has a better lottery number than 1 at A. By the same reasoning as in
Case ii, conditional on Case iii, student k + 1 has a better lottery number than 1 at A and
so qualified there (Zk+1,A(R) = 1) with probability p1(l, k).
Case iv : Both students 1 and k + 1 apply for A. This case happens with probability
k − 1
k
× l − 1
l
by the same reason as in Cases iii and iv. In this case, again by ρϕ1A = ρ
ϕ
k+1,A,
only one of students 1 and k+1 with a better lottery number is assigned to A and qualified
for A. Conditional on Case iv, student 1 has a better lottery number than k + 1 at A and
so qualified there (Z1A(R) = 1) with the following probability.
p
≡ Pr(R1A < Rk+1,A|D1B(R) = 0, Dk+1,C(R) = 0)
= Pr(U [min{R2,B, ..., Rk,B}, 1] < U [min{Rk+2,C , ..., Rk+l,C}, 1])
= Pr(U [min{R2,A, ..., Rk,A}, 1] < U [min{Rk+2,A, ..., Rk+l,A}, 1])
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max{t− x, 0}dt Γ(k)
Γ(1)Γ(k − 1)
(1− x)k−3 × Γ(l)
Γ(1)Γ(l − 1)
(1− y)l−3dxdy,
where the third equality uses the STB lottery regime while the fifth equality uses the fact
that (R2A, ..., RkA) and (Rk+2,A, ..., Rk+l,A) are independent. Letting
p̄








max{t− y, 0}dt Γ(k)
Γ(1)Γ(k − 1)


















max{t− y, 0}dt(1− x)k−3 × (1− y)l−3dxdy
≤ 1,






To sum up all cases, students 1 and k + 1’s qualification probabilities at A are different
as follows:
Pr(ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1)









× l − 1
l































× l − 1
l





× l − 1
l
× p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡p4(k,l)










× l − 1
l
× p̄︸ ︷︷ ︸
















× p1(l, k) +
k − 1
k
× l − 1
l
× p̄
= Σx=i,ii,iii,iv Pr(Case x)× Pr(ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1,Case x)
= P (ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1),





× (p1(l, k)− 1) > p3(k, l) comes from the following facts:
• 1
k







> 0 (by l > k ≥ 2).
• p1(k, l)−1 < p1(l, k)−1 < 0 (the first inequality is by l > k while the second inequality
is because both p1(k, l) and p1(k, l) are nondegenerate conditional probabilities).
This proves that there is no gDA mechanism with the STB lottery structure for which the
qualification IV research design extracts a random assignment.
For any gDA mechanism with MTB, the argument is simplified as follows.
Case i : Neither student 1 nor k + 1 applies for A, i.e., 1 and k + 1 are assigned B and C,





. In this case, no student applies for
A, and A is undersubscribed. Both students 1 and k + 1 are therefore qualified for A.
Case ii : Only student k + 1 applies for A. This case happens with probability
1
k
× l − 1
l
.
In this case, student k + 1 is always assigned A and qualified for A. Student 1 is qualified
for A if and only if student 1 has a better lottery number than student k + 1 at A. By
ρϕ1A = ρ
ϕ
k+1,A, this happens with probability 1/2 by the MTB lottery structure, where R1A
and Rk+1,A are i.i.d. even conditional on Case ii (D1B(R) = 1 and Dk+1,C(R) = 0).






this case, student 1 is always assigned A and qualified for A. Student k+1 is qualified for A
if and only if student k+1 has a better lottery number than 1 at A. By the same reasoning
as in Case ii, this happens with probability 1/2.
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Case iv : Both students 1 and k + 1 apply for A. This case happens with probability
k − 1
k
× l − 1
l
. In this case, only one of students 1 and k + 1 with a better lottery number
is assigned A and qualified for A. Conditional on Case iv, by ρϕ1A = ρ
ϕ
k+1,A, student 1 has a
better lottery number than k + 1 at A with probability 1/2.
To sum up all cases, students 1 and k + 1’s qualification probabilities at A are different
as follows:
Pr(ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θ1)

















































= Σx=i,ii,iii,iv Pr(Case x)× Pr(ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1,Case x)
= P (ZiA(R) = 1|ρϕiA = ρ, θi = θk+1),
where the key inequality is by l > k. Therefore, at the above problem, there is no gDA
mechanism with any lottery structure for which the qualification IV research design extracts
a random assignment.
B Additional Discussion
B.1 General Definition of a Random Assignment
Definitions 2 and 4 in the main body define a random assignment under the first-choice and
qualification instrumental variable (IV) research designs, respectively. This section explains
these definitions are special cases of a unified definition of a random assignment under
general empirical research designs. It is therefore legitimate to compare the first-choice and
qualification IV research designs based on Definitions 2 and 4.
Given any dataset from any assignment problem, I consider a class of empirical research
designs that try to identify causal effects of being assigned to any given treatment school s.
Each research design in this class tries to achieve the goal by instrumenting for the treatment
assignment (Dis(r0)) with some instrumental variable Z
∗
is(r0), where r0 is the realized lottery
number profile in the data. For simplicity, I consider only binary instrumental variables, i.e.,
Z∗is(·) : R → {0, 1} where R is the set of all possible lottery number profiles. Define Θ as
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the set of all possible student types θi = (i, (ρis)s∈S). Let (Θ1, ...,Θm) be a partition of
Θ with ∪mk=1Θk = Θ. I allow the research design to do instrumenting conditional on which
type partition cell contains each student’s type (i.e., conditional on (1{θi ∈ Θk})k=1,...,m) and
within a restricted sample I∗s (r0) ⊂ I, where I∗s (·) : R → I where I is the set of all subsets
of the set of students I.
For outcome Yi of interest, the research design measures the effect of treatment assign-
ment Dis(r0) on Yi by estimating the following Two Stage Least Square regression model or
a similar IV model within the restricted sample I∗s (r0):




21{θi ∈ Θk}) + ε2i (second stage regression)






11{θi ∈ Θk}) + ε1i (first stage regression)
The above class of research designs is parametrized by what IV to use (Z∗is), which aspects
of student type to control for (Θ1, ...,Θm), and what sample restriction to impose (I
∗
s ). I
allow these objects to change depending on different gDA mechanisms. For any research
design in the class, I introduce the following definition of extracting a random assignment.
Definition 7. An empirical research design with instrumental variable Z∗is, conditioning
(Θ1, ...,Θm), and sample restriction I
∗
s extracts a random assignment for a gDA mech-
anism ϕ if at any assignment problem X and for any school s,
P (Z∗is(R) = 1|i ∈ I∗s (r), (1{θi ∈ Θk})k=1,...,m = v, θi = θ)
= P (Z∗is(R) = 1|i ∈ I∗s (r), (1{θi ∈ Θk})k=1,...,m = v),
for any potential lottery realizations r, any vector v ∈ {0, 1}m, and any student type θ for
which these conditional probabilities are well-defined.
Only under this conditionally random assignment does the IV Z∗is generate an exogenous
or random variation in assignment treatment Dis (Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) chapter 4,
Manski (2008) chapter 3, Angrist and Pischke (2009) chapter 4). Whether a research design
extracts a random assignment depends on which gDA mechanism generates the data since
different mechanisms produce different Z∗is, (Θ1, ...,Θm), and I
∗
s .
The first-choice and qualification IV research designs are two members of this research
design class. The first-choice design corresponds to a research design with the treatment
assignment as the instrumental variable Z∗is(r) = Dis(r), no conditioning (Θ1, ...,Θm) = Θ,
and sample restriction I∗s (r) = Firsts(r). The qualification IV design corresponds to a
research design with the qualification instrumental variable Z∗is(r) = Zis(r), modified priority
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conditioning Θk = {θ ∈ Θ|ρϕis = k}, and no sample restriction I∗s (r) = I. Substituting these
corresponding objects shows that Definition 7 nests as special cases Definitions 2 and 4 for
the first-choice and qualification IV research designs, respectively. Definitions 2 and 4 are
therefore comparable, making it legitimate to use these definitions to compare the first-choice
and qualification IV research designs.
B.2 Strategy-proofness for Schools is not Exactly Necessary
Section 3.4 shows that the first-choice research design does not extract a random assignment
for the DA, Charlotte, and top trading cycles mechanisms, which are not strategy-proof for
schools. This suggests strategy-proofness for schools is almost necessary for the first-choice
research design to extract a random assignment. On the other hand, strategy-proofness for
schools turns out to be not exactly necessary. To see this, consider the following mecha-
nism. Given an assignment problem and realized lottery numbers, the partially deferred
acceptance mechanism is defined through the following algorithm.32
• Step 1: Each student i applies to her most preferred acceptable school (if any). Each
school accepts its highest-priority (with respect to ρis+ ris) students up to its capacity
and rejects every other student. Finalize these acceptances and subtract the number
of each school’s acceptances from that school’s capacity.
• Step 2: Each student who has not been accepted by any school applies to her most
preferred acceptable school that has not rejected her (if any). Each school tentatively
keeps the highest-ranking students up to its remaining capacity (after the subtraction
at step 1), and rejects every other student.
In general, for any step t ≥ 3,
• Step t: Each student i who was not tentatively assigned to any school in Step t − 1
applies to her most preferred acceptable school that has not rejected her (if any). Each
school tentatively keeps the highest-ranking students up to its remaining capacity (after
the subtraction at step 1) from the set of students tentatively assigned to this school in
previous step t− 1 and the students newly applying, and rejects every other student.
The algorithm terminates at the first step at which no student applies to any school. Each
student tentatively kept by a school at that step or accepted by that school at step 1 is
allocated a seat in that school, resulting in an assignment.
32Agarwal and Somaini (2015) call this mechanism the “first preferences first” mechanism while the same
name is used by others to mean a different mechanism. I use a different name to avoid confusion.
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The partially deferred acceptance mechanism is a mix of the Boston mechanism and
the DA mechanism in that the first step is process as in the Boston mechanism while the
remaining steps are processed as in the DA mechanism. The partially deferred acceptance
mechanism can be interpreted as modifying priorities so that each school prioritizes stu-
dents ranking it first over students ranking it lower, and the partially deferred acceptance
mechanism is a gDA mechanism with (fϕ(m) = m, gϕ(n) = 1{n 6= 1}(K + 1)).
The partially deferred acceptance mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools by a similar
reason for the DA mechanism. However, the first-choice research design extracts a random
assignment for the partially deferred acceptance mechanism with any lottery regime. The
reason is that given any assignment problem and lottery realization, the treatment assign-
ments of students ranking the treatment school first are finalized at the first step of the
algorithm, and their treatment assignments (whether each of them is assigned to the first-
choice treatment school) are the same as those produced by the Boston mechanism with the
same lottery realization. Corollary 1(a) therefore implies that the first-choice design extracts
a random assignment under the partially deferred acceptance mechanism with any lottery
regime. Hence, the first-choice research design may extract a random assignment even for a
mechanism that is not strategy-proof for schools.
Nevertheless, I am not aware of any empirical study that uses data from the partially
deferred acceptance mechanism. As long as more widely-used and widely-discussed mecha-
nisms such as the Boston, DA, Charlotte, and top trading cycles mechanisms are concerned,
strategy-proof for schools is necessary, as summarized in Proposition 1.
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